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“Wreaking Extraordinary Destruction”: 
Defendant’s Irreplaceability as Presumptively 




Senator Kamala Harris: “Your agency will be separating children from 
their parents and—” 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen: “No. 
What we’ll be doing is prosecuting parents who have broken the law, 
just as we do every day in the United States of America.”  
Harris: “They will be separated?” 
Nielsen: “Just as they [are] in the United States every day.”1 
In the summer of 2018, people across the United States were 
enraged at the Trump Administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy 
for illegally crossing the southern border,2 which entailed sepa-
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 1. Authorities and Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the United 
States: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 115th Cong. 19 (2018) (statement of Kirstjen Nielsen). 
 2. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL ANNOUNCES ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY FOR CRIMINAL ILLEGAL ENTRY 
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero 
-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/EUK3-T2X8]; Q&A: 
Trump Administration’s “Zero-Tolerance” Immigration Policy, HUM. R. WATCH 
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/16/qa-trump 
-administrations-zero-tolerance-immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/8XFG 
-MY2M]. The zero-tolerance policy was seemingly intended as a deterrence tac-
tic; one news article noted that a Trump administration official said, “Trump is 
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rating children from their parents when families crossed to-
gether.3 Child advocates decried the policy, arguing that isolat-
ing migrant children from their parents could “cause irreparable 
harm, disrupting a child’s brain architecture and affecting his or 
her short- and long-term health,”4 and fearing the “serious, neg-
ative consequences to children’s health and development” and 
the “psychological distress, anxiety, and depression associated 
with separation from a parent.”5 The news coverage of this con-
troversial practice ultimately culminated in the Trump Admin-
istration rescinding the policy through an executive order.6 Six 
months after the announcement of the executive order, hundreds 
of children remained separated from their parents;7 it soon be-
 
convinced that family separation has been the most effective policy at deterring 
large numbers of asylum-seekers.” Julia Ainsley & Geoff Bennett, Trump’s Sup-
port of Renewed Child Separation Policy Led to Collision with Nielsen, NBC 
NEWS (April 8, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump 
-has-months-been-urging-administration-reinstate-child-separation-policy 
-n992021 [https://perma.cc/NMR9-8WE8].  
 3. See Leslie Shapiro & Manas Sharma, How Many Migrant Children Are 
Still Separated from Their Families?, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2018), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/tracking-migrant-family 
-separation/?utm_term=.c1c51c8c3100 [https://perma.cc/WH4S-FYX8]; Sarah 
Stillman, America’s Other Family-Separation Crisis, NEW YORKER (Nov. 5, 
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/11/05/americas-other-family 
-separation-crisis [https://perma.cc/P58J-LLXL]. 
 4. Colleen Kraft, AAP Statement Opposing Separation of Children and 
Parents at the Border, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS (May 8, 2018), https://www.aap 
.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/StatementOpposing 
SeparationofChildrenandParents.aspx [https://perma.cc/G2RR-EKNR]. 
 5. Children’s Defense Fund et al., Renewed Appeal from Experts in Child 
Welfare, Juvenile Justice and Child Development to Halt the Separation of Chil-
dren from Parents at the Border, CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.childrensdefense.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/child-welfare 
-juvenile.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JAU-PXU7]. 
 6. Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 25, 2018), https:// 
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/06/25/2018-13696/affording 
-congress-an-opportunity-to-address-family-separation [https://perma.cc/ 
3JAU-PXU7] (“It is also the policy of this Administration to maintain family 
unity, including by detaining alien families together where appropriate and con-
sistent with law and available resources.”). 
 7. Arelis R. Hernández, Nearly 250 Migrant Children Still Separated 
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came apparent that thousands more children than originally es-
timated were separated from their families, and alarmingly, the 
government “has no way of tracking the children taken from 
their parents.”8 Over a year after the executive order claimed to 
end the family separation policy, 700 more families had been sep-
arated, often due to loopholes in the executive order.9 
 Family separation is not limited to immigrant populations. 
An estimated 3.6% of all minor children in the United States are 
currently separated from their parent(s) due to parental incar-
ceration.10 Mass incarceration has been a growing issue in the 
United States for decades,11 but a surge in the incarceration of 
women over the last half century has led to a dramatic uptick in 
the number of children deprived of their primary parents as a 
result of incarceration.12 In 1970, over 70% of counties in the 
 
 8. Sarah Jones, Trump Administration: Reuniting Some Separated Mi-
grant Families Might Be Too Hard, NEW YORK MAG. (Feb. 4, 2019), http:// 
nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/hhs-reuniting-separated-migrant-families 
-hard.html [https://perma.cc/6GLT-FGE5]. 
 9. Nina Bala & Arthur Rizer, Trump’s Family Separation Policy Never Re-
ally Ended. This Is Why., THINK (July 1, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
think/opinion/trump-s-family-separation-policy-never-really-ended-why 
-ncna1025376 [https://perma.cc/964Z-8M97].  
 10. DOUG HAMILTON ET AL., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT 
ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4 (PEW CHARITABLE TRS. 2010), https://www 
.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/ 
collateralcosts1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7E2-D5TA] (“2.7 million children 
have a parent behind bars—1 in every 28 children (3.6[%] has a parent incar-
cerated, up from 1 in 125 just 25 years ago. Two-thirds of these children’s par-
ents were incarcerated for non-violent offenses.”). The most recent statistics 
from the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that 2.3% of all children in the 
United States had an incarcerated parent in 2007. LAURA E. GLAZE & LAURA 
M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR 
MINOR CHILDREN 2 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UV6D-YJZ4]. This number only reflects the number of chil-
dren with parents in state or federal prison, not jail. See id. at 1. 
 11. JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE NEW DYNAM-
ICS OF MASS INCARCERATION 8 (2018), https://www.vera.org/downloads/ 
publications/the-new-dynamics-of-mass-incarceration-report.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/5XRT-27YB]. 
 12. While the incarceration of men and fathers is an important issue as 
well, several portions of this Note focus on the incarceration of primary care-
giver parents, which more often than not means mothers. This Note speaks 
about the special incarceration issues of women because, as a generalization, 
women continue to be impactful in United States children’s lives. See Gretchen 
Livingston & Kristen Bialik, 7 Facts About U.S. Moms, PEW RES. CTR. (May 10, 
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/10/facts-about-u-s 
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United States did not hold women in their jails at all.13 In con-
trast, as of November 2018, there were approximately 219,000 
women incarcerated in the United States;14 roughly 1.5 million 
women are put in jail during a calendar year.15 Seventy-two per-
cent of the women incarcerated in the United States have minor 
children,16 and most of these incarcerated mothers were the pri-
mary caregivers of their children just prior to incarceration,17 
leaving nearly 150,000 children currently separated from their 
mothers.18 
Just as immigrant children separated from their parents 
undergo “extremely detrimental” trauma,19 so too do children 
isolated from their parents when those parents are incarcer-
ated.20 Parents suffer from the separation as well; statistics sug-
gest that severing the relationship between a mother and her 
 
-mothers/ [https://perma.cc/2457-V9Y5] (noting that in 2016, working mothers 
spent an average of fourteen hours a week on childcare, while working fathers 
spent just eight; and that about one in four U.S. mothers are single parents, 
versus only 7% of U.S. fathers). 
 13. ELIZABETH SWAVOLA ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, OVERLOOKED 6 
(2016), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/overlooked-women-and 
-jails-report-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DW6-DG69]. 
 14. Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/ 
pie2018women.html [https://perma.cc/KVC7-XLMP].  
 15. HUM. R. WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, YOU MISS SO MUCH 
WHEN YOU’RE GONE: THE LASTING HARM OF JAILING MOTHERS BEFORE TRIAL 
IN OKLAHOMA 21 (2018), https://www.aclu.org/report/you-miss-so-much-when 
-youre-gone [https://perma.cc/QU27-7JG8]. 
 16. Wendy Sawyer, The Gender Divide: Tracking Women’s State Prison 
Growth, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.cc/NN44-Y2CH].  
 17. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 16. 
 18. Id. at 13 app. t.1. While the number of children left behind from the 
incarceration of fathers is greater (1,559,200 children left behind from 744,200 
incarcerated fathers in 2007), the impact on children from maternal incarcera-
tion (147,400 children left behind from 65,600 incarcerated mothers in 2007) 
may be greater because mothers are more likely to be primary caregivers for the 
children; the most common caregiver of an incarcerated father’s child is the 
other parent (generally, the mother). Id. at 13, 16. 
 19. Hurley Riley, The Impact of Parent-Child Separation at the Border, U. 
MICH. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Sept. 7, 2018), https://sph.umich.edu/pursuit/ 
2018posts/family-separation-US-border.html [https://perma.cc/T5WS-Z7L4]. 
 20. Stillman, supra note 3.  
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child is linked to higher rates of recidivism and more parole vio-
lations.21 The sudden and unexpected need for a family member 
or family friend to step into a parenting role can put a strain on 
family and the community, especially grandparents of children 
with incarcerated parents.22 Everyone is obligated to follow the 
law, and there should be an investigation and accountability 
when laws are broken. But the harms that accrue on the incar-
cerated parent’s child are harsh, long-lasting, and undeserv-
ing;23 careful consideration should be undertaken before a child 
needlessly undergoes psychological trauma, economic insecurity, 
and a risk of severance of their parents’ rights.24 An adult who 
has been convicted of a crime should be the one subjected to any 
resulting punishment, not the child of that adult.25 
For defendants with dependents who rely on them, incarcer-
ation creates a multi-dimensional harm when these defendants 
are unable to continue caring for their families. Some federal 
courts have noted the value of assigning defendants a lower sen-
tence than ordinarily would be imposed “when a term of impris-
onment may ‘wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents 
who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing.’”26 While 
 
 21. STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHIL-
DREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 4 (2009), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/ 
cyf/childrenofincarceratedparents.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDZ3-G84R]. 
 22. Jillian J. Turanovic et al., The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration 
Revisited: A Qualitative Analysis of the Effects on Caregivers of Children of In-
carcerated Parents, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 913, 918 (2012). 
 23. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 24. See infra Parts I.A.3, I.B.1. 
 25. See Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 793, 843–59 (2011) (discussing that the criminal justice system is prem-
ised on punishing autonomous, rational adults, not children). 
 26. United States v. Kon, No. 04 CR, 271-03 (RWS), 2006 WL 3208555, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 
(2d Cir. 1992)). The court went on to note three Second Circuit cases where a 
departure was upheld for defendants who provided support for their families. 
Id. Several other courts have used the “wreaking destruction” or “wreaking 
havoc” language to convey the seriousness of the harm of parental incarceration 
on dependents. See, e.g., Johnson, 964 F.2d at 129 (“The rationale for a down-
ward departure here is not that Johnson’s family circumstances decrease her 
culpability, but that we are reluctant to wreak extraordinary destruction on de-
pendents who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing.”); United States 
v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945–46 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (“The court possesses 
the discretion to avoid wreaking extraordinary destruction on dependents who 
rely on the defendant for their care.”); United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 
2d 89, 98–99 (D. Mass. 2002) (“I depart only in recognition of my unwillingness 
to wreak havoc on the life of the dying [defendant’s wife,] Ms. LaCarubba.”). 
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many courts focus on the “extraordinary” nature of the defend-
ant’s support for their dependents when considering a lower sen-
tence for a defendant, a few courts have instead used an “irre-
placeability” test to determine if a defendant’s support for their 
dependents is so irreplaceable that it necessitates a downward 
departure in sentencing.27 This “irreplaceability” test better ad-
dresses the needs of dependents; merely analyzing the unique-
ness or “extraordinariness” of the situation does not consider the 
value of the defendant’s support for their dependents. 
This Note provides an overview of the scope and harms of 
parental incarceration, the United States federal sentencing re-
gime, and how a defendant’s caregiving and financial support 
factors into (or fails to be factored into) their sentence. Part I 
provides background information on the increasing number of 
incarcerated parents in the United States, the rippling effects of 
parental incarceration, and the United States Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines and federal sentencing law. Next, Part II.A ex-
plores how federal sentencing considers a defendant’s family ties 
and responsibilities, under both the Guidelines and after the 
Guidelines became non-mandatory. Part II.B explores United 
States v. Huerta and United States v. Kon, two cases that utilize 
an “irreplaceability” test in determining if the defendant’s ab-
sence will affect his or her dependents to a degree that the court 
should take these collateral consequences into account at sen-
tencing. Finally, Part III considers solutions to mitigate the 
harm of parental incarceration. Part III.A reviews previous 
scholarship suggesting legislative and policy suggestions. Part 
III.B advocates for the Huerta and Kon test to be more widely 
utilized in the federal courts. Part III.C addresses counterargu-
ments. The incarceration of parents is a pervasive issue and its 
effects are long-ranging; advocates, policy makers, judges, and 
legislators should use all available tools to lessen the harmful 
effects of incarceration on defendants’ families. 
I.  PARENTAL INCARCERATION: A CRACK IN THE 
FAMILY FOUNDATION 
Since the beginning of time, the family has been the founda-
tional unit of societal organization.28 Ancient societies organized 
 
 27. See infra Part II.B. 
 28. See Douglas J. Brewer & Emily Teeter, Ancient Egyptian Society and 
Family Life, FATHOM ARCHIVE (2004), http://fathom.lib.uchicago.edu/2/ 
21701778/ [https://perma.cc/WCE6-5KYT]. 
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themselves into nuclear families,29 and the Supreme Court has 
recognized the fundamental rights to marry30 and parent.31 
However, the drastic rise of incarceration in the last century 
(and particularly the rise in women’s incarceration) has had tur-
bulent, yet often unexamined, impacts on the family. Section A 
discusses the scope of parental incarceration, detailing the in-
crease in incarcerated mothers over the last several decades and 
what happens to their children. Section B discusses the many 
repercussions of parental incarceration, including harms to chil-
dren, parents, and community members. Section C provides 
background on United States federal sentencing law. 
A. THE PREVALENCE OF FAMILY SEPARATION DUE TO PARENTAL 
INCARCERATION 
Family separation is a pervasive issue, and has been for dec-
ades. But the recent increase in the incarceration of women has 
led to more children with primary caretakers behind bars.32 
When these children have their primary caretaker arrested or 
incarcerated, their lives can be turned upside down.33 The larger 
the pool of incarcerated parents becomes, the more the ripple ef-
fects of their incarceration reverberate throughout their families 
and communities. 
1. Mass Incarceration in the United States 
The United States is well-known as the top incarcerating 
nation worldwide.34 After several decades of a “historically un-
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78 (1987). 
 31. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see discussion infra Part 
I.B.2. 
 32. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 34. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COMM. ON LAW & JUS-
TICE, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014), http://nap 
.edu/18613. This dramatic growth of incarceration includes both state and fed-
eral prisons. Other organizations offer similar statistics. See Wendy Sawyer & 
Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIA-
TIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html 
[https://perma.cc/GA2C-KTYK] (“The American criminal justice system holds 
almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 109 federal prisons, 1,772 juve-
nile correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 80 Indian Country jails as well 
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precedented and internationally unique” increase in incarcera-
tion rates,35 statistics suggest that there are over 2.1 million in-
carcerated individuals in the United States.36 The rapid increase 
in incarceration rates from 1973 (approximately 200,000 people 
incarcerated) to 2009 (1.5 million people incarcerated)37 was per-
haps somewhat spurred by increasing crime rates,38 but the dra-
matic increase in incarceration was likely caused by policy 
choices that “significantly increased sentence lengths, required 
prison time for minor offenses, and intensified punishment for 
drug crimes.”39 The slew of policy decisions that resulted in dec-
ades of greater and greater incarceration rates did not drasti-
cally decrease the rate of crime;40 however, and consequentially, 
it is estimated that nearly 40% of United States state and federal 
prisoners (roughly 576,000 people) “are incarcerated with little 
public safety rational”; that is, incarcerating these people does 
not make the public any safer.41 
The rapid increase in prison populations has led to over-
crowding, underqualified staff, and limited services and pro-
gramming options for prisoners.42 Inmates can have a variety of 
 
as in military prisons, immigration detention facilities, civil commitment cen-
ters, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories.”). 
 35. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 2. 
 36. Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_ 
region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/47QB-79TG] (noting that the 
United States has the highest number of incarcerated individuals in the world 
at 2,121,600 people, as of January 13, 2020). 
 37. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 2. This is a 750% increase 
in the population of incarcerated people. 
 38. Id. at 2–3. The homicide rates in the United States increased dramati-
cally in the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in 1980 (10.2 homicides per 100,000 
United States residents). ALEXA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 2 
(2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3AFC-EPQ6]. After peaking again in 1991 (9.8 homicides per 100,000 United 
States residents), the homicide rate has decreased or remained steady ever 
since. Id.  
 39. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 4; see also JAMES AUSTIN 
& LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, HOW MANY AMERICANS 
ARE UNNECESSARILY INCARCERATED? 3–4 (2016), https://www.brennancenter 
.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Unnecessarily_Incarcerated_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U58Y-HYTJ]. 
 40. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 3. 
 41. AUSTIN & EISEN, supra note 39, at 7. 
 42. See CRAIG HANEY, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF INCARCERATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-PRISON ADJUSTMENT 2–3 (2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
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psychological reactions to incarceration, which may include hy-
pervigilance, “psychological distancing,” social withdrawal, or 
“post-traumatic stress reactions to the pains of imprisonment.”43 
If someone already struggles with mental illness (as many prison 
inmates do44), prison conditions can lead to intense psychological 
stress.45 In addition to these psychological harms, when a pris-
oner is released, collateral consequences form regulatory and le-
gal limitations on a formerly incarcerated person’s access to oc-
cupational licensing, employment, housing, education, voting, 
and other benefits, rights, and opportunities.46 On top of these 
personal harms, parents must bear the burden of bringing eco-
nomic strain, instability, and mental health issues upon their 
families.47 
2. The Surge of Incarceration of Primary Caregivers 
According to recent estimates, 2.7 million children have an 
incarcerated parent.48 Studies suggest that almost 7% of United 
States children have lived with a parent who has been incarcer-




 43. Id. at 4–12 (“[B]ecause many prisons are clearly dangerous places from 
which there is no exit or escape, prisoners learn quickly to become hypervigilant 
and ever-alert for signs of threat or personal risk. . . . The alienation and social 
distancing from others is a defense not only against exploitation but also against 
the realization that the lack of interpersonal control in the immediate prison 
environment makes emotional investments in relationships risky and unpre-
dictable. . . . For some prisoners, incarceration is so stark and psychologically 
painful that it represents a form of traumatic stress severe enough to produce 
post-traumatic stress reactions once released.”). 
 44. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 7 tbl.12 (noting that 56.5% of 
all parents in state prison have a mental health problem, with a much higher 
percentage (72.8%) for mothers in state prison who lived with their minor chil-
dren prior to incarceration). 
 45. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 6. 
 46. About, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, 
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/VT83-GG5G].  
 47. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 48. This adds up to about one in every twenty-eight children. Doug Hamil-
ton et al., supra note 10, at 4. The latest statistics from the United States De-
partment of Justice state that over 1.7 million minor children in the United 
States had a parent in prison in 2007. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 
1.  
 49. This amounts to over five million kids. DAVID MURPHEY & P. MAE 
COOPER, PARENTS BEHIND BARS: WHAT HAPPENS TO THEIR CHILDREN? 3 
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sented more than half of the 1.5 million state and federal prison-
ers in the United States.50 Over the preceding sixteen years, the 
percentage of parents in state and federal prison grew by 79%,51 
with a corresponding increase in children with an incarcerated 
parent at 80%.52 The percentage of mothers in state and federal 
prisons increased by 122%,53 and the increase in children of in-
carcerated mothers was over 130%.54 
The incarceration of women, especially at the state and local 
level, has grown faster than the rate for men since the 1970s; 
women are now the fastest-growing population of incarcerated 
people in the United States.55 The majority of incarcerated 
women in the United States have minor children (over 60% of 
women in prison and almost 80% of women in jails),56 and 5% of 
women housed in jails are pregnant.57 In less than two decades, 
the number of children with a mother in prison has increased 
131%.58  
The majority of incarcerated women are imprisoned for non-
violent offenses.59 While some have noted that initial analysis of 
comparative data may suggest that women are given lighter sen-
tences than men, one study demonstrated that “direct compari-




 50. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 1 (estimating that 809,800 of 
the total 1,518,535 prisoners in the United States (approximately 53%) were 
parents as of 2007). 
 51. Id. at 1. This rate was lower than the overall increase in state and fed-
eral prison populations during the same time period (92% increase from 1991 to 
2007). Id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 13 app. tbl.1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Sawyer, supra note 16. 
 56. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 15, 
at 3. 
 57. Id. at 29. 
 58. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 2.  
 59. Kajstura, supra note 14. Percentages of nonviolent female offenders in 
local jails, state prisons, and federal prisons are 86%, 63%, and 95%, respec-
tively. Id. One report declared, “the vast majority of offenses committed by 
women are relatively minor and non-violent.” ROSS PARKE & K. ALISON 
CLARKE-STEWART, EFFECTS OF PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON YOUNG CHIL-
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less blameworthy than her male counterpart” when the offense, 
offender’s prior record, the relationship between the offender 
and the crime victim, and how the crime was carried out are 
taken into consideration.60 When women commit drug crimes, 
they commonly are low-level actors, serving as mules or assist-
ing male intimate partners in drug conspiracies.61 Considering 
how common it is for incarcerated women to be mothers, and to 
be the primary caregivers of their minor children, coupled with 
the proportion of total inmates who are unnecessarily incarcer-
ated, and the amount of female offenders who have committed 
non-violent offenses, it appears that incarcerated mothers are 
paying a devastating price for a perceived public safety goal that 
isn’t being effectuated. 
These incarcerated mothers are often women of color.62 For 
parents incarcerated at the state level, mothers were more likely 
than fathers to report past physical or sexual abuse (four times 
more likely), homelessness (twice as likely), and medical and 
mental health problems (one and a half times more likely).63 The 
majority of mothers in state and federal prisons had experienced 
 
 60. Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight of 
Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133, 
135 (1999). 
 61. Id. A drug mule is “a drug courier who is paid, coerced or tricked into 
transporting drugs across an international border but who has no further com-
mercial interest in the drugs.” EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & 
DRUG ADDICTION, A DEFINITION OF “DRUG MULES” FOR USE IN A EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT 3 (2012), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/system/files/publications/692/ 
EMCDDA_ThematicPapers_DrugMules_329088.pdf [https://perma.cc./GWX4 
-4AFM]. The practice of taking advantage of economically disadvantaged 
women to use them in drug rings is an international issue:  
Almost without exception these [Latin American] women represent the 
lowest rung of labor in the drug trade. . . . Others become involved in 
the trade through their emotional ties to men—whether lovers, broth-
ers, or fathers. . . . [Trafficking] is destroying many families, not just 
the people who consume but also those of us who are in prison because 
of someone stronger than us, someone who simply used and abused us. 
Corina Giacomello, How the Drug Trade Criminalizes Women Disproportion-
ately, N. AM. CONGRESS ON LATIN AM. (June 17, 2014), https://nacla.org/article/ 
how-drug-trade-criminalizes-women-disproportionately [https://perma.cc/ 
5CAV-PPNH]. 
 62. Approximately 50% of state inmates who are mothers are White, about 
27% are Black, and 15% are Hispanic. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 
13 app. tbl.2. For federal inmates who are mothers, approximately 36% are 
White, 29% are Black, and 31% are Hispanic. Id. 
 63. Id. at 7. 
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physical or sexual abuse, mental health problems, and substance 
dependence or abuse.64 
The disparities apply to the children of the incarcerated, too. 
More children of color have parents in prison than White chil-
dren;65 reports suggest that Black children are nearly twice as 
likely to have an incarcerated parent as White children.66 In ad-
dition, rural children, poor children, and children with parents 
that have limited education are disproportionately affected by 
parental incarceration.67 While nearly half of the children of in-
carcerated mothers in state prisons are nine years old or 
younger, it is estimated that over one-third of all children will 
turn eighteen during the course of their parent’s incarceration.68 
3. What Happens to Children When Their Primary Caregiver 
Is Incarcerated: The Process 
A parent’s arrest can significantly impact a child, even if the 
child did not witness the arrest firsthand.69 The child “may feel 
shock, immense fear, anxiety, or anger towards the arresting of-
ficers or law enforcement in general. . . . [S]uch events can and 
often do have a negative impact on a child’s immediate and long-
term emotional, mental, social, and physical health.”70 In addi-
tion, this traumatic experience can lead to a higher likelihood 
that the child will have problems with law enforcement or com-
mit criminal acts in the future.71 
Upon a parent’s arrest, their child (or children) may be left 
with the other parent, a relative of the child, or a caregiver des-
ignated by the parent.72 Otherwise, law enforcement is supposed 
 
 64. Id. at 19 app. tbl.12. 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. MURPHEY & COOPER, supra note 49, at 4. 
 67. Id. 
 68. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 3. 
 69. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS 1 
(2014), https://www.bja.gov/publications/iacp-safeguardingchildren.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6B5K-BRGD]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 1–2. 
 72. Different voices have different views on how much weight to give care-
giver designation by the parent. A U.S. Department of Justice report notes that:  
Parents have the right to express their preference in where they would 
like their child to be housed and the person(s) who should provide care 
and supervision. If the arrested parent has sole custody of the child, he 
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to arrange for the child to go into the child welfare system.73 Un-
fortunately, researchers have noted that many children are “left 
to fend for themselves in empty apartments for weeks or even 
months in the wake of a parent’s arrest.”74 Fortunately, this is-
sue has caught the attention of the federal government in recent 
years, and police-created model policy statements identify the 
importance of considering the possibility of children’s involve-
ment before pursuing an arrest,75 minimizing trauma to chil-
dren, and “support[ing] a child’s physical safety and well-being 
following an arrest.”76 
 
or she should be given a reasonable opportunity to select a caregiver 
unless the arrest is for child abuse or neglect, . . .   
but officers should confirm that designated caregivers have the ability to be ap-
propriate placements for the children. Id. at 15–16. Other reports note that the 
child’s placement may be largely dictated by an officer’s judgment call; a Cali-
fornia research publication states, “[n]early two-thirds of the responding agen-
cies report that they will accept an arrestee’s suggested caretaker, at the dis-
cretion of the arresting officer. . . . An officer’s response is conditioned by limited 
resources, and depends on the ability of the officer to make a judgment call in 
the field.” MARCUS NIETO, IN DANGER OF FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS: CHIL-
DREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS 13 (2002), http://www.library.ca.gov/Content/ 
pdf/crb/reports/02-009.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ37-94TT]. In the case of an ar-
rested mother, it is much more likely in practice that a police officer or sheriff 
(46% likelihood), or a child protective services worker (46%) will decide if the 
parent’s designated caretaker is suitable than the arrested mother herself (6% 
likelihood). Id. at 14 chart 4; id. at p. 54.  
 73. See INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 69, at 15–16; LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, INCARCER-
ATED PARENTS MANUAL: YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2 (Carol 
Strickman et al. eds., 2010), https://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/01/Incarcerated-Parents-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/74TL 
-KWY7]. “Child welfare” is defined as “a continuum of services designed to en-
sure that children are safe and that families have the necessary support to care 
for their children successfully.” CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., WHAT IS CHILD WELFARE? A GUIDE FOR EDUCATORS 1 (2018), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cw_educators.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8Z97-KK93]. Child welfare agencies often have mechanisms for reporting and 
addressing child abuse and neglect, arranging for children in unsafe homes to 
live with other family members or foster families, and handling reunification 
and adoption. Id. 
 74. GINNY PUDDEFOOT & LISA K. FOSTER, KEEPING CHILDREN SAFE WHEN 
THEIR PARENTS ARE ARRESTED: LOCAL APPROACHES THAT WORK 9 (2007), 
https://www.pdx.edu/ccf/sites/www.pdx.edu.ccf/files/CAprojectKeepingChildren 
SafeWhenParentsAreArrested.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8RE-VFRY]. 
 75. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
69, at 12. 
 76. Id. at 8 (“The overriding policy statement of the Model Policy that 
guides this discussion paper states that: It is the policy of this department that 
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As noted, upon a caregiver’s arrest, if neither a parent, rel-
ative, or designated caregiver are willing and fit to take the 
child, then the child goes to a foster care placement.77 Foster care 
is a temporary caregiving situation (with care given by the 
child’s relatives, unrelated foster parents, or in a residential 
placement) provided by the state for parents who cannot care for 
their children.78 Foster care may mean instability in a child’s 
placement, and difficulty in maintaining connections to siblings, 
extended family, friends, school, and their community.79  
The latest statistics suggest that there are nearly 443,000 
children in foster care in the United States every year,80 with 
approximately 7% (over 20,000 children) in the system due to 
parental incarceration.81 Approximately 3% of parents incarcer-
ated in state prisons have children in foster care,82 but the gen-
der of the incarcerated parent changes the statistic; for state-
incarcerated mothers, children are five times more likely than 
children of state-incarcerated fathers to be put in foster care.83 
While all parental incarceration can carry a risk of disrup-
tion in children’s lives, there are special repercussions that ac-
company the recent increase in the incarceration of mothers. 
Around 80% of mothers in federal and state prisons were the pri-
mary caregivers of their children prior to incarceration (as op-
 
officers will be trained to identify and respond effectively to a child, present or 
not present, whose parent is arrested in order to help minimize potential trauma 
and support a child’s physical safety and well-being following an arrest.”). 
 77. Id. at 15–16; LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, supra note 
73, at 2. It should be noted that relatives may also serve as foster parents. 
 78. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Foster Care, 
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/ 
outofhome/foster-care/ [https://perma.cc/4MKZ-WK4Y].  
 79. CHRISTIAN, supra note 21, at 3. 
 80. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMI-
LIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE 
AFCARS REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/resource/afcars-report 
-25 [https://perma.cc/ZH6F-D4QE]. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 5. 
 83. Id. at 5 (noting that the percentage of state prison-incarcerated fathers 
who have children cared for in a foster home or agency is 2.2%, whereas the 
number for mothers is 10.9%). 
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posed to around 30% of federally- and state-incarcerated fa-
thers).84 For most fathers who are incarcerated in state prisons, 
their children are very likely to be cared for by another parent 
when they become incarcerated (88%), but this is much less 
likely for incarcerated mothers (37%).85 Mothers were more 
likely to be in single-parent households prior to incarceration, 
leaving no second parent to care for a child when the mother is 
imprisoned.86 When a father is incarcerated, the child usually is 
cared for by their mother; when a mother is incarcerated, the 
inverse is not nearly as common. 
The problem of parental incarceration is expansive, and af-
fects numerous children throughout the United States. These 
children often suffer through challenging processes, suffer dis-
ruptions in their lives and daily routines, and this disruption can 
impact their development. 
B. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF PARENTAL INCARCERATION: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY 
Parental incarceration can harm everyone who is impacted 
by it. The children left behind must scramble to adjust to a life 
with one less caregiver and financial supporter, in addition to 
dealing with the stigma of having an incarcerated parent.87 The 
incarcerated parent must live with the guilt of those they have 
left behind, in addition to the typical challenges that come along 
with incarceration.88 In addition, community members may suf-
fer from a lost neighbor, friend, or supporter.89 
1. The Harms to Children  
Parental incarceration has a strong correlation with eco-
nomic strain in children’s households, an increased risk of insta-
bility in the child’s living situation, and a higher likelihood of 
 
 84. Around 77% of mothers in state prisons and over 80% of mothers in 
federal prison were the primary caregivers of their children prior to incarcera-
tion; 26% of state-incarcerated fathers and 31% of federally-incarcerated fathers 
were the primary caregivers of their children prior to incarceration. Id. at 16. 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. Id. at 4 (noting that of the state prison-incarcerated parents who lived 
with their minor children prior to arrest or incarceration, 17.2% of fathers re-
ported living in a single-parent home, whereas 41.7% of mothers reported living 
in a single-parent home). 
 87. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 88. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 89. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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interaction with the child welfare system.90 Moving homes, hav-
ing a non-relative parental figure, divorce, and switching schools 
can threaten a child’s healthy development.91 Research has 
linked parental incarceration with health, behavioral, and edu-
cational problems; mental and physical health issues can follow 
these children into their adulthood.92 Parental incarceration is 
associated with other Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs),93 
which are “exposures that are associated with increased risk for 
trauma, or toxic stress, particularly when they are cumulative,” 
such as living with someone struggling with substance abuse or 
mental illness, parental divorce, or witnessing domestic vio-
lence.94 Among children who have had a parent incarcerated, 
over one-third have been a witness to violence between their par-
ents or guardians.95 The disruption in the child/parent relation-
ship, long-lasting stress, and replacement care (that may be in-
adequate) can weigh heavily on children, and disrupt their 
healthy development.96 As a result, children may turn to harm-
ful and destructive behaviors, such as withdrawal, physical and 
verbal aggression, hypervigilance, sexualized actions, fighting, 
gang involvement, substance abuse, and antisocial characteris-
tics.97 Further, the stigma of having an incarcerated parent itself 
is harmful to children.98 These psychological, physical, financial, 
and educational hurdles can last even after a child’s parent has 
ended their incarceration.99 
 
 90. CHRISTIAN, supra note 21, at 3. 
 91. Id. at 3. 
 92. MURPHEY & COOPER, supra note 49, at 1–2. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. Id. at 4–5. 
 95. Id. at 4–5. This is in contrast to children without an incarcerated par-
ent, among whom 10% had witnessed violence between their parents or guard-
ians, or witnessed or experienced violence in their neighborhood. Id. at 5. 
 96. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 
6 (2006), https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/ccj/CCJ%20CIP%20FINAL% 
20REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FKR-VG7K]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally, MURPHEY & COOPER, supra note 49 (explaining such 
harms). 
 99. Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change 
for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385, 385 (2018) (discussing 
the “detrimental consequences that can continue even long after a parent has 
been released”). 
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2. The Harms to Parents 
The effects of incarceration on each incarcerated parent and 
their family can be devastating. While one might think that the 
overall increase in incarceration has caused an increase in chil-
dren entering foster care, studies suggest the inverse—the re-
moval of a child leads to an increase in criminal activity for their 
mother.100 A mother’s responsibility for her child can serve as a 
motivating factor, or a “brake on a parent’s destructive behav-
ior . . . Once that brake is removed, destructive behavior acceler-
ates.”101 In contrast, community-based sentencing programs 
(where a mother is able to avoid incarceration altogether, and 
can therefore spend time with her children) have demonstrated 
lower rates of recidivism and better chances of family preserva-
tion.102 
While much attention is paid to the harms on children sep-
arated by their parents, less is written about the harms mothers 
suffer when they are separated from their children. Their expe-
riences can mirror or be impacted by their child’s trauma, caus-
ing panic, anxiety, and depression.103 Mothers separated from 
 
 100. TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., HARD DATA ON HARD TIMES: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE, AND VISITATION, 9–10 
(2004), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/vera/245_461.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L5W6-2VJU] (concluding that according to a study of New York mothers whose 
children entered foster care in the fiscal year 1997, “[c]hild removal appears to 
accelerate criminal activity among the study group’s mothers”).  
 101. Id. at 14; see also DIANA BRAZZELL, USING LOCAL DATA TO EXPLORE 
THE EXPERIENCES AND NEEDS OF CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 4 
(2008), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/31861/411698 
-Using-Local-Data-to-Explore-the-Experiences-and-Needs-of-Children-of 
-Incarcerated-Parents.PDF [https://perma.cc/L5W6-2VJU] (noting that based 
on research from Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, “the number of bookings in-
creased steadily in the years before foster care placement, spiked in the year of 
placement, and continued to rise in the years after placement”). 
 102. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM’N., THE EFFECTS OF 
PARENTAL INCARCERATION ON CHILDREN: NEEDS AND RESPONSIVE SERVICES, 
H.R. 203, S. 52, at 24 (2011), https://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/resources/documents/ 
ftp/documents/children%20of%incarcerated%20parents.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C5NZ-PNMT] (“According to the survey of 24 community-based programs for 
mother [sic] and children in 14 states, ‘community sentencing programs yielded 
reduced recidivism and increased family preservation – outcomes that have pos-
itive implications for children’s adjustment.’”). Visitation alone can decrease re-
cidivism rates for parents. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 387.  
 103. Kimberly Lawson, The Lasting Impact Family Separation Can Have on 
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their children may have suicidal thoughts, risk losing their will 
to live, discontinue sleeping or eating, or fail to adequately take 
care of themselves.104 The pain of incarceration as a parent ex-
tends further than the torment of living life behind bars. 
Parents placed in jails or prisons are unable to continue car-
ing for their children at home. Consequentially, they run the risk 
that their children could be removed from their homes (if there 
is not another, fit parent available to care for them), and even-
tually their parental rights may be terminated. Removal of a 
child from their parent/guardian105 and termination of parental 
rights106 are two separate legal processes (although they can cer-
tainly be related). Termination of parental rights can happen 
voluntarily or involuntarily, and is a much longer process.107 An 
incarcerated mother can lose her parental rights to her child if 
her child is in the state’s care and the state files a petition for 
termination of parental rights,108 if the other parent of the child 
files for their new spouse to adopt the child, or if a family mem-
ber cares for the child and requests adoption, proceedings 
begin.109 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)110 
adds further complications; it includes a provision that if a child 
remains in (non-relative) foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-
two months, then the state is required to file a petition for the 
termination of parental rights and search for a suitable family 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Child removal provisions vary by state. For example, in Minnesota, chil-
dren may be removed from their parents for various reasons, such as abandon-
ment; physical or sexual abuse (or witness thereof); emotional maltreatment; 
lacking necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care; med-
ical neglect; failure to thrive; prostitution; running away; or habitual truancy. 
MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subd. 6 (2018). 
 106. See Overview of Terminating Parental Rights, FAMILY LAW SELF-HELP 
CTR. (2020), https://www.familylawselfhelpcenter.org/self-help/adoption 
-termination-of-parental-rights/overview-of-termination-of-parental-rights 
[https://perma.cc/ACN3-25BE] (explaining that termination of parental rights 
means “the person’s rights as a parent are taken away. The person is not the 
child’s legal parent anymore,” and listing seven reasons (abandonment, neglect, 
fitness, risk of injury, token efforts, “Failure of Parental Adjustment,” and sex-
ual assault) for termination). 
 107. See, e.g., § 260C.301. 
 108. Emily Halter, Parental Prisoners: The Incarcerated Mother’s Constitu-
tional Right to Parent, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 539, 551–52 (2018). 
 109. Id. It should be noted that parental rights are not usually terminated 
immediately upon incarceration. Id. at 551. 
 110. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 
2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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for the child’s adoption.111 The average length of an incarcerated 
parent’s stay in state prison is estimated at seven years (and 
nine years for federal prison), leaving many parents at risk of 
their state child welfare agency filing termination proceed-
ings.112 While incarceration alone is not a sufficient reason for 
severance of parental rights,113 a parent’s inability to care for 
their children during (and after) incarceration can contribute to 
termination of parental rights proceedings.114 Termination of pa-
rental rights are ordinarily final; the parent loses their legal re-
lationship with their child.115 
3. The Harms to the Community 
Not every incarceration harms the community from which 
the incarcerated individual came; community members can ben-
efit when their neighbors who committed crimes are incarcer-
ated.116 Similarly, when one shares a home with someone who 
 
 111. Id. at § 103(a)(3). ASFA provides for several exceptions to the 15/22 
months rule: termination petitions are not required (1) if a relative is caring for 
the child, (2) if filing the petition would not be in the child’s best interests, or (3) 
if the state has failed to provide the child’s family with adequate reunification 
services. Id. 
 112. Philip M. Genty, The Inflexibility of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
and Its Unintended Impact upon the Children of Incarcerated Parents and Their 
Families, 1 CHILD WELFARE 360° 10, 10 (2008), https://cascw.umn.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/12/CW360.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L2G-B458]; see also 
GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 20 (noting that at the time of a 2004 
survey, 62.5% of state prison-incarcerated mothers (and 78.9% of federal prison-
incarcerated mothers) had served over twelve months already, and 38.2% of 
state-incarcerated mothers (and 54.4% of federally-incarcerated mothers) had 
at least twelve months remaining on their current sentence). 
 113. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental lib-
erty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their 
child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or 
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”). 
 114. See Halter, supra note 108, at 551–53 (“Parental rights are generally 
not terminated at the moment that someone is incarcerated. However, mothers 
occasionally lose their parental rights during, and as a result of, incarcera-
tion . . . . Once a child ends up in the foster system, it is incredibly difficult to 
get him or her out. . . . [O]nce parental rights are terminated, it is usually fi-
nal.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761 (“For the foster parents, the State’s 
failure to prove permanent neglect may prolong the delay and uncertainty until 
their foster child is freed for adoption. But for the natural parents, a finding of 
permanent neglect can cut off forever their rights in their child.”). 
 116. Todd R. Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Exam-
ination of Concentrated Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 
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struggles with substance dependency or is criminally-involved, 
it can be “enormously stressful and disruptive to healthy family 
functioning.”117 While some family members may help with car-
ing for children and contributing income, criminally-involved in-
dividuals may strain family resources and hinder positive par-
enting efforts.118 Still, the high number of incarcerated parents 
with low-level and nonviolent119 offenses indicates that many of 
these incarcerated parents may not be harmful if they stayed in 
their homes.120 
Caregivers undergo a major strain when adding another de-
pendent to their lives and homes; suddenly becoming responsible 
for a child can be “a major, unexpected role transition.”121 While 
the most common caregiver for incarcerated fathers’ children is 
the other parent, the top caregiver for incarcerated mothers’ chil-
dren is a grandparent (and in particular, a grandmother).122 
Caregivers face a variety of challenges, including the need to 
change residences with children due to added economic burdens, 
and difficulty maintaining their jobs.123 Grandparent caregivers 
often have their limited physical, emotional, and financial re-
sources strained in their new caregiving role, and may struggle 
to manage their own needs (such as depression and chronic 
 
33, 38 (2003) (noting that “[i]n a study of two high-incarceration neighborhoods, 
Rose, Clear, and Ryder (2000) found that while residents benefited from the 
incarceration of family members and neighbors who were committing crimes, 
they suffered many losses as well”). 
 117. Turanovic et al., supra note 22, at 914, 920 (noting that “if [a] parent 
was engaging in dangerous or reckless behaviors before imprisonment, then his 
or her incarceration may allow for the remaining family system to function more 
positively”). 
 118. Id. at 914. 
 119. PARKE & CLARKE-STEWART, supra note 59, at 12; Kajstura, supra note 
14. 
 120. It is estimated that over half a million of incarcerated Americans do not 
pose a risk to public safety. AUSTIN & EISEN, supra note 39, at 7. 
 121. Turanovic et al., supra note 22, at 918. 
 122. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that 88.4% of incar-
cerated fathers in state prison in 2004 had their minor children cared for by the 
other parent, yet only 37% of incarcerated mothers could say the same. State 
prison-incarcerated mothers were more likely to have a grandparent (44.9%), 
usually a grandmother (42.1%), care for their children while incarcerated). In-
deed, grandparents have played an important role in childrearing for centuries. 
Robin McKie, Wisdom of Grandparents Helped Rise of Prehistoric Man, GUARD-
IAN (July 23, 2011, 7:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2011/jul/24/ 
prehistoric-man-helped-as-elderly-survived [https://perma.cc/JWZ2-H9X8]. 
 123. Turanovic et al., supra note 22, at 917. 
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health issues).124 Additional difficulties include guilt over their 
ability to parent in the place of the missing biological parents, 
the sensitive topic of petitioning for legal custody of children, and 
handling particularly difficult children.125 The consequences of 
parental incarceration extend beyond merely a parent and child, 
seeping into extended family and community members’ lives. 
C. UNITED STATES FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW 
Federal sentencing law has several provisions relating to 
the defendant’s caregiving and financial support to their depend-
ents, and for determining whether there would be an adequate 
replacement for those dependents in the defendant’s absence. 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines set the bar fairly high, allow-
ing for this to be taken into consideration at the sentencing stage 
only if the circumstances are “extraordinary” (as in, outside the 
ordinary consequences of a family member being incarcerated).  
Since the advent of the United States Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, judges have generally followed the standardized for-
mula it provides for federal criminal sentencing. The Guidelines 
were closely adhered to for decades, and their pervasive reach 
continues, even after the Supreme Court declared that federal 
judges have the discretion to sidestep the Guidelines. 
1. The Genesis of the United States Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and United States v. Booker 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 directed the United 
States Sentencing Commission to create federal sentencing 
guidelines in order to decrease sentencing disparities and pro-
mote proportionality and transparency in sentencing.126 By 
1987, the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the 
Guidelines” or “the Sentencing Guidelines”) were created, 
providing federal judges with a uniform guide for determining 
 
 124. Id. at 918. 
 125. Id.  
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sentencing outcomes.127 Judges were bound by the Guidelines,128 
and were forced to work within their framework until the Su-
preme Court’s 2005 case United States v. Booker, which shifted 
the Guidelines from being mandatory on judges to being merely 
advisory.129 
In United States v. Booker, defendant Freddie J. Booker was 
found guilty of possession with intent to distribute at least fifty 
grams of crack cocaine, based on evidence that Booker had 92.5 
grams of crack cocaine in his bag.130 The Sentencing Guidelines 
directed the judge to sentence Booker to between 210 and 262 
months in prison,131 but at a post-trial sentencing proceeding, 
the judge concluded that by a preponderance of the evidence 
Booker was guilty of obstructing justice, and that he had pos-
sessed an additional 566 grams of crack cocaine.132 The obstruc-
tion charge and the additional possession mandated a sentence 
between 360 months and life imprisonment.133 In the end, “in-
stead of the sentence of 21 years and 10 months that the judge 
could have imposed on the basis of the facts proved to the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt, Booker received a 30-year sentence” 
(based on the obstruction and additional possession charges, de-
termined by the judge using a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, without a jury).134 
The Sixth Amendment, however, gives each defendant pro-
tection “against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. The Operative U.S. Code provision states that: 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence 
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless 
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration 
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 
should result in a sentence different from that described. In determin-
ing whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, 
the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy state-
ments, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.  
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000). 
 129. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005) (holding that “two 
provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) that have the effect of 
making the Guidelines mandatory must be invalidated”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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which he is charged,”135 and defendants have “the right to de-
mand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime 
with which he is charged.”136 Therefore, the Supreme Court held 
that when Booker’s judge made a determination that affected his 
sentencing without the jury and with a lower standard of proof, 
the decision violated the Sixth Amendment.137 Booker therefore 
morphed the Sentencing Guidelines from requirements placed 
on judges with limited discretion, to a system that is now “effec-
tively advisory.”138  
In the aftermath of Booker, courts use a three-step process 
with the Guidelines. Courts are instructed to have respectful 
consideration of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual 
(1) in initially calculating the sentencing range; 
(2) in considering policy statements or commentary in the Guidelines 
Manual about departures from the guideline range; and 
(3) in considering all of the § 3553(a) factors (which include the guide-
lines, commentary, and any relevant policy statements in the Guide-
lines Manual) in deciding what sentence to impose, whether within the 
applicable range, or whether as a departure or as a variance (or as 
both).139 
Despite the discretion the Booker decision granted judges in 
determining sentences, judges have largely continued to follow 
the Sentencing Guidelines, possibly because a sentence within 
the Guidelines is often viewed as presumptively “reasonable” on 
appeal,140 and judges are concerned about having their decisions 
overturned,141 or because they are comfortable and familiar with 
 
 135. Id. at 230 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, (1970)). 
 136. Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995)). 
 137. Id. at 235, 243–44. 
 138. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). 
 139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 126, at 12. 
 140. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 401 (“[After Booker,] [i]n Rita v. United 
States, the Supreme Court [created the presumption] . . . that a sentence within 
the Guidelines range was a reasonable sentence. . . . [T]he presumption creates 
a powerful temptation for trial judges (who are understandably not eager to be 
overturned) to sentence defendants within the Guidelines range.”). For an ar-
gument that not all Guidelines sentences are automatically “reasonable,” see  
Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines 
World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 711 (2006) (“[T]his does not provide an auto-
matic pass for all Guidelines sentences because such an interpretation flies in 
the face of making the Guidelines discretionary . . . . [T]he [§ 3553(a)] directive 
to consider . . . the defendant’s characteristics . . . seems to render post-Booker 
Guidelines sentences open to reasonableness challenges.”). 
 141. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 402–03. 
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the Guidelines.142 Therefore, while judges are not required to fol-
low the their ubiquity of its following necessitates a closer look. 
2. Federal Sentencing Law and the Sentencing Process 
Federal sentencing considers both “utilitarian and retribu-
tivist theories of punishment.”143 The Sentencing Guidelines 
provide that when a judge is considering a defendant’s sentence, 
they should “consider the nature and seriousness of the conduct, 
the statutory purposes of sentencing, and the pertinent offender 
characteristics.”144 Then, “[t]he court should impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
statutory purposes of sentencing.”145 In the Criminal Sentencing 
provision of the United States Code, judges are instructed to con-
sider both the defendant’s offense and their personal history and 
characteristics, and “the need for the sentence imposed” in terms 
of proportionality, deterrence, and the most effective treat-
ment.146 While both sources express a desire for retributivism, 
they also mention taking into account a defendant’s personal his-
tory and characteristics, including the effect the defendant has 
on others.147 The emphasis on calculating both a particular de-
fendant’s culpability and the effect on public safety underlying 
 
 142. Mark Osler & Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” Amer-
ica’s Mass Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
117, 155–56 (2014) (suggesting several reasons for judges’ adherence to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, including past experience, cognitive anchoring, and the 
seemingly “empirical approach” of the Guidelines). 
 143. Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe to Include Considerations of 
the Effects on Families and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 
UMKC L. REV. 73, 75 (2014). 
 144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, introductory cmt. (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 145. Similarly, the U.S. Code notes that: “[t]he court shall impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes . . . of 
this subsection.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). Those purposes note that  
[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider—. . . (2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
vide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence 
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in 
the most effective manner. 
Id. 
 146. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2018). 
 147. See id.; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, ch. 5. 
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these instructions demonstrates overarching objectives of ac-
countability, but also due consideration for the rippling effects 
the defendant has on their community; retribution is not the sin-
gular goal of the United States federal sentencing regime. 
Most federal sentencing proceeds in the following manner: a 
defendant agrees to plead guilty (often in order to gain access to 
the benefits of a prosecutor’s plea deal) and then the defendant 
presents a “factual basis” to the court (admitting to the basic 
components of the offense).148 The court tells the defendant the 
range of potential punishment, based on the Sentencing Guide-
lines.149 To use the Sentencing Guidelines, judges identify the 
crime committed, consider any relevant history (the criminal 
record) of the defendant, and locate the box on a grid correspond-
ing to the recommended range of months of imprisonment.150 
Certain situations or characteristics of a defendant may cause 
the judge to assign a sentence above or below the recommended 
window. These aggravating or mitigating factors that affect sen-
tencing outcomes are referred to as “departures” or “vari-
ances.”151  
Under the Sentencing Guidelines Section 5H1.6, considera-
tion of a defendant’s “family ties and responsibilities are not or-
dinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be 
warranted,”152 which has usually been interpreted to mean that 
family ties may only cause an adjustment if the familial respon-
sibilities are of an extraordinary nature.153 “Extraordinary” is 
 
 148. U. S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 126, at 5 (“Over 95% of federal 
defendants convicted of a felony or Class A misdemeanor offense are adjudicated 
guilty based on a guilty plea rather than on a verdict at a trial.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 1B1.1. 
 151. Id. ch. 1, pt. A(1)(4)(b). A “departure” is a non-Guidelines sentence (that 
is, a sentence not within the assigned Guidelines range for the offense) due to a 
provision in Chapter Four (“Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood”) or 
Chapter Five (“Determining the Sentence”) of the Sentencing Guidelines; simi-
larly, a “variance” is a non-Guidelines sentence due to consideration of the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at v; 
United States v. Valenzuela-Perez, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 (D.N.M. 2011). 
 152. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 5H1.6. 
 153. See United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (declar-
ing that “the ‘extraordinary’ can be defined only in relation to the ‘ordinary’; and 
at the risk of belaboring the obvious, we add that ordinary family responsibili-
ties can be very great”). See discussion infra Part II.A.1 for further detail on 
Section 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities departures. 
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not clearly defined,154 and the interpretations have not been con-
sistent.155 Although the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advi-
sory for judges, in practice, some Circuits have continued to stick 
with the “extraordinary” criteria, while others have been more 
open-minded to considering family ties as a mitigating factor at 
sentencing.156 
After determining the Sentencing Guidelines range, the 
court decides whether to implement the sentence bargained for 
in the plea deal, or amend the sentence.157 The United States 
Sentencing Commission recommends that the court wait until 
after it has reviewed the presentence report before accepting the 
plea deal.158 The presentence report, ordinarily created after the 
guilty plea hearing, includes information taken during a presen-
tence interview about “a wide variety of matters concerning the 
defendant’s offense or offenses of conviction and related un-
charged criminal conduct, criminal history, personal history (in-
cluding family history and substance abuse history), financial 
circumstances, and numerous other issues potentially related to 
the court’s sentencing decision.”159 The presentence report lists 
the offense and the defendant’s information, the punishment 
range from the Sentencing Guidelines, and “any bases that may 
 
 154. See United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(“How does this human being compare to others the trial court has 
seen? . . . How atypical does he or she have to be . . . ? Where ought the line be-
tween typical and atypical be? No bright line rule was announced by the Com-
mission; none can be announced by a court.”); Tracy Tyson, Downward Depar-
tures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Are Parenthood and Pregnancy 
Appropriate Sentencing Considerations?, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
577, 595–96 (1993) (“Because the Commission never states the extent to which 
it considered family ties and responsibilities, ‘there is really no way of knowing 
whether or not the Commission would view the circumstance of this case as 
“unusual.”’ . . . The result is a[n] erratic group of sentencing decisions lacking 
an underlying policy.” (quoting United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d 
Cir. 1989)). 
 155. See, e.g., Jason Binimow, Annotation, Downward Departure from 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 1A1.1 et seq.) Based On Ex-
traordinary Family Circumstances, 145 A.L.R. FED. 559 (updated 2020) (cata-
loguing cases from 1988 to 2018 that were either granted or denied a downward 
departure based on extraordinary family circumstances); see also Tyson, supra 
note 154, at 596–99 (reviewing “an erratic body of decisional law”). 
 156. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 404–07; see infra note 198 (discussing the 
Second Circuit’s receptiveness to family ties and responsibilities departures). 
 157. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 126, at 5. 
 158. Id. at 5–6. 
 159. Id. 
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exist for imposing a sentence outside of the applicable range.”160 
A sentencing hearing follows, where the court may hear infor-
mation regarding mitigating factors, before orally announcing a 
sentence.161 These mitigating factors, including “extraordinary” 
family ties and responsibilities, can make a dramatic difference 
in the outcome of a defendant’s case, as sentences entailing doz-
ens of months in prison can be downgraded to result in probation 
instead.162 
II.  THE LIMITED CONSIDERATION OF FAMILY SUPPORT 
AND CAREGIVING UNDER FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW 
Many courts continue to utilize the “extraordinary” analysis 
when considering downward departures for family ties and re-
sponsibilities, either under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or 
federal sentencing law.163 This analysis does not have clear di-
rection for implementation, is inconsistently applied, and weighs 
a family’s uniqueness more heavily than their need for support. 
Yet, both before and after United States v. Booker (when the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines went from mandatory to advisory), 
some federal courts have instead employed a “replaceability” test 
to evaluate whether the defendant’s absence creates such nega-
tive collateral consequences on their families as to deserve a 
downward departure at sentencing.164 This takes a step away 
from reviewing the culpability of the defendant, and a step to-
wards according due weight to the effects on incarceration on the 
defendant’s family.165 By overlooking the “replaceability” test, 
judges miss out on an opportunity to save children from unnec-
essary parental incarceration and the accompanying conse-
quences. 
 
 160. Id. at 6. The imposition of a “sentence outside of the applicable range” 
is, as previously mentioned, called a “variance” or a “departure.” Id.  
 161. Id. at 6–7. 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Kon, No. 04 CR, 271-03 (RWS), 2006 WL 
3208555 at *1, *3–4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (noting a defendant who pled 
guilty to two drug-related felonies, which yielded a Guidelines range of thirty to 
thirty-seven months of imprisonment, but due to a successful downward depar-
ture, the defendant was only sentenced for one day of incarceration (which she 
had already served) and three years of supervised release). 
 163. See, e.g., id. at *4–5. 
 164. See e.g., United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D. Mass. 
2012). 
 165. See id. 
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A. HOW PARENTS FIT INTO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING REGIME 
AFTER BOOKER 
As mentioned above, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
leave a small pathway166 for family ties and responsibilities to 
be considered at sentencing, but only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances. The judicial discretion involved in determining 
what suffices as “extraordinary” can lead to advantageous out-
comes for some, but the inconsistency in its application hurts 
many others. As the Guidelines have been demoted and lessened 
in their authority, judges have considered utilizing other sen-
tencing provisions to use a defendant’s status as a parent as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing.167 Still, the judicial landscape is 
rife with inconsistent practices: some judges depart under Sec-
tion 5H1.6 of the Guidelines, while others apply variances under 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).168 Whatever provision a sentencing judge 
uses, the “extraordinary” analysis continues to be used.169 
1. Departures: Sentencing Guidelines Section 5H1.6, Family 
Ties and Responsibilities 
The Commentary to Section 5H1.6 of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines notes that when a judge is determining if a down-
ward departure is appropriate in cases involving loss of caregiv-
ing or financial support, they should consider (1) whether the 
 
 166. This pathway may appear narrow when courts observe a rigorous defi-
nition of “extraordinary” family circumstances, but latest statistics demonstrate 
that for all federal sentences granted downward departures from the Guidelines 
range, “Family ties and responsibilities (§ 5H1.6)” was the sixth most popular 
reason, with 1,697 cases departed for that reason (which constitutes 4.0% of the 
total 42,387 reasons given for downward departures in fiscal year 2018, and of 
the total 69,425 federal cases in fiscal year 2018, there were 16,179 in which 
downward departures were granted). WILLIAM H. PRYOR JR. ET AL., Reasons 
Given by Sentencing Courts for Downward Departures from the Guideline 
Range, in 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS 104, 104 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual 
-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G9G-C7S8]. 
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Perez, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 
(D.N.M. 2011) (considering both the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3553(a) in analyzing the defendant’s children’s struggles). 
 168. See id. (“‘Variance’ and ‘departure’ are of course terms of art, and 
though the outcome—a non-guidelines sentence—might be the same, different 
analyses are required. A departure involves application of Chapter 4 or 5 of the 
sentencing guidelines [such as § 5H1.6], while a variance involves consideration 
of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” (citations omitted)). 
 169. See infra notes 170–77 and accompanying text. 
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sentence “will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of es-
sential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defend-
ant’s family,”170 (2) whether “[t]he loss of caretaking or financial 
support substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to in-
carceration for a similarly situated defendant,”171 (3) if there is 
“no effective remedial or ameliorative programs” available, 
“making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irre-
placeable172 to the defendant’s family,”173 and (4) if “[t]he depar-
ture effectively will address the loss of caretaking or financial 
support.”174 Notably, these criteria point to the effect that the 
defendant’s presence or absence has on their family members,175 
not on their culpability for the crime they have been charged 
with.176 
 
 170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 5H1.6. 
 171. Id. 
 172. One judge noted the challenge in determining the exact meaning of the 
powerful words in these criteria, focusing on “irreplaceable”:  
But this enterprise is not about word games. I see a continuum of cases 
representing the adverse impact a defendant’s incarceration can have 
on innocent dependants [sic], from the ‘ordinary burdens’ to ‘signifi-
cantly’ more burdens than usual. The issue is at what point on that 
continuum burdens are imposed on innocent dependents that are 
simply not justified by our legitimate need to punish the wrongdoer, 
that are cruel and unnecessary. 
United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 173. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, § 5H1.6. 
 174. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez, No. CR 09-3078 JB, 2011 WL 
6828055, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (considering “substantial, direct, and spe-
cific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support” as a factor as 
the court addressed the appropriateness of “a departure for the loss of caretak-
ing or financial support to the defendant’s family”). 
 175. See United States v. Trinidad-Toledo, No. CR 06-1646 JB, 2007 WL 
506190, at *5 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2007), aff’d, 260 F. App’x 74 (10th Cir. 2008) (“An 
examination of the cases denying the departure reveals that a primary consid-
eration is the extent the individual is needed in the home.”). 
 176. Some courts have noted that incarceration, despite its collateral conse-
quences on family members, is simply the cost a defendant must pay for com-
mitting a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 859 F.3d 468, 473 (7th Cir. 
2017) (“Every sentencing judge knows that a prison sentence will impose hard-
ships on an offender’s family. Every judge has heard heartrending accounts of 
those hardships. The most common response is to . . . [note that] the hardship 
was caused by the offender’s decision to commit the crimes for which he is being 
sentenced.”); United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“That’s an unfortunate thing that’s happened to your family [regarding a sick 
child with no alternative caregiver], but the fact that [the defendant is ab-
sent] . . . is something based on conduct [the defendant] chose to commit. And I 
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Many have requested downward departures under Section 
5H1.6 (Family Ties and Responsibilities), and despite a freedom 
to deviate from the Guidelines, judges oftentimes hold fast to the 
“extraordinary” bar that has been set.177 Even with this adher-
ence, the interpretation of “extraordinary” varies widely across 
courtrooms. Courts note that an “extraordinary” case is a situa-
tion “outside the heartland of similarly situated defendants.”178 
Courts often find the incarceration of single parents and primary 
caregivers the norm, noting that “[a] sole, custodial parent is not 
a rarity in today’s society . . . . [I]n many cases . . . the children 
will have to live . . . in foster homes. . . . [The defendant]’s situa-
tion, though unfortunate, is simply not out of the ordinary.”179 
One court recently noted that it would be willing to depart 
in “a situation where the young child has serious health prob-
lems and requires constant care,”180 or “if there was no mother 
or other family members present to care for the child.”181 Yet, a 
defendant with three minor children suffering from various 
physical and mental health problems,182 a single mother of two 
 
expressly reject that as a consideration that should somehow mitigate his sen-
tence.”). Other courts have mentioned a concern for proffering special treatment 
to defendants who are parents. See, e.g., United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 
1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Imprisoning the mother of a child for even a short 
period of time is bound to be a wrenching experience for the child, but the guide-
lines do not contemplate a discount for parents of children.”). 
 177. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 178. Trinidad-Toledo, 2007 WL 506190, at *5; cf. United States v. 
Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Whether a particular case is ap-
propriate for downward departure is a question of its lying ‘outside the heart-
land,’ that is, outside the ordinary. . . . There is no requirement that the circum-
stances be extra-ordinary by any particular degree of magnitude . . . . [The 
circumstances need not be] extra-extraordinary (i.e., ‘truly extraordinary’ or ‘so 
extraordinary’).”). 
 179. United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990); see United 
States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 103 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he unfortunate reality 
[is] that single parents often commit crimes requiring incarceration.”). 
 180. United States v. Justice, No. CR 09-3078 JB, 2012 WL 394455, at *11 
(D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012). 
 181. Id.; see also United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(“It may not be unusual, for example, to find that a convicted drug offender is a 
single mother with family responsibilities, but, at some point, the nature and 
magnitude of family responsibilities (many children? with handicaps? no 
money? no place for children to go?) may transform the ‘ordinary’ case of such 
circumstances into a case that is not at all ordinary.”). 
 182. United States v. Valenzuela-Perez, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1276–77 
(D.N.M. 2011). 
  
2020] WREAKING EXTRAORDINARY DESTRUCTION 2595 
 
whose children would go into foster care,183 and a defendant who 
was a single mother of five (including a child with a neurological 
disorder)184 were denied downward departures. These incon-
sistent outcomes result in some defendants benefiting from the 
criteria, while many others are left in the dust.185 
2. Variances: Defendant’s History and Characteristics Under 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
One court explained the shift from utilizing Section 5H1.6 
of the Guidelines to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors for 
family tie evaluations by noting that “[a]lthough ‘[t]he concept of 
departures has been rendered obsolete in post-Booker sentenc-
ing . . . the district court may apply those departure guidelines 
by way of analogy in analyzing the section 3553(a) factors.’”186 
Thus, courts have treated § 3553(a) somewhat similarly to the 
pre-Booker Section 5H1.6 analyses.187 Federal courts are in-
structed to “apply the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in 
 
 183. Brand, 907 F.2d at 33–34. 
 184. Sweeting, 213 F.3d at 97, 101–02 (denying a downward departure for a 
single mother of five minor children, the oldest of which suffered from Tourette’s 
Syndrome). 
 185. The Huerta court listed a number of cases that were or were not granted 
downward departures. United States v. Huerta, 371 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2004). 
The Huerta court noted that they granted downward departures in the following 
cases: “where defendant was sole provider for his wife (who had a ‘limited earn-
ing capacity’ because of her difficulty speaking English) and their two children 
(ages 8 and 9)”; “where the defendant was the sole caretaker for her three chil-
dren and the young child of her institutionalized daughter”; and “where the de-
fendant and his wife were responsible for caring for their two daughters (ages 4 
and 11), the defendant’s disabled father (who depended on the defendant to help 
him in and out of his wheelchair) and the defendant’s grandmother.” Id. The 
court then noted situations where a downward departure was not granted, in-
cluding a case where there were nearby family members that could assist the 
defendant’s wife with childcare; a case where five of the defendant’s six children 
were over eighteen, and there was evidence that family members were available 
to care for the minor child; and a case where the defendant’s child did not live 
with him and his ex-wife earned a $40,000 salary). Id. at 95. 
 186. United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) (second 
and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 
785, 792 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 187. It should be noted that § 3553(a) explicitly references the Guidelines as 
a factor for judges to consider. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (“The court, in 
determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—. . . (4) the 
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—(A) the applicable 
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set 
forth in the guidelines . . . .”); see also Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and 
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determining whether to apply a sentence within the advisory 
guidelines range,”188 including “the history and characteristics 
of the defendant.”189 Yet, one federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
acknowledged that while the § 3553(a) factors effectively re-
placed Section 5H1.6 commentary, the court still focused on the 
same aspects (namely, pointing out that “the relevant inquiry is 
the effect of the defendant’s absence on his family members”).190 
Despite the different verbiage in § 3553(a) focusing on the de-
fendant’s history and characteristics, courts continue to consider 
the effect of the defendant’s presence or absence on family mem-
bers when making family responsibility-related decisions. 
B. UNITED STATES V. HUERTA AND UNITED STATES V. KON: 
DEFENDANT’S IRREPLACEABILITY 
In United States v. Huerta,191 defendant-appellee Albert 
Huerta pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiring to submit and 
submitting false statements relating to health care matters.192 
Huerta had two minor children, an unemployed wife, and pro-
vided financial, moral, and physical caretaking support to his 
disabled and uninsured father.193 In considering a Section 5H1.6 
Family Ties and Responsibilities claim,194 the Second Circuit 
was dismayed that the district court failed to expressly address 
the replaceability of Huerta’s roles as a physical, emotional, and 
financial caretaker for his child and family.195 The court high-
lighted how crucial replaceability was to its determination re-
garding if a downward departure in the defendant’s sentence 
was appropriate: “this factor—the absence or presence of adults 
who can step in during the defendant’s incarceration to assist 
 
the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1174 (“[C]ourts are 
awarding more downward departures than previously. In the post-Booker 
world . . . ‘[c]onsideration of family responsibilities’ may now be viewed as part 
of a defendant’s ‘history and characteristics,’ and judges can assess those traits 
as reasons to mitigate the length of sentences.” (third alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1))). 
 188. Schroeder, 536 F.3d at 755 (quoting Miranda, 505 F.3d at 791). 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 190. Schroeder, 536 F.3d at 756. 
 191. 371 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 
 192. Id. at 90. 
 193. Id. at 94. 
 194. Huerta was decided in 2004, before United States v. Booker was decided 
in 2005; therefore, the court’s analysis was rooted in the Sentencing Guidelines, 
and the court performed its analysis under Section 5H1.6. See id. 
 195. See id. at 94–95. 
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with caring and providing for the defendant’s dependents—is a 
central part of the extraordinary family circumstances in-
quiry.”196 Because the court could not tell if Huerta’s wife could 
sustain the family business in Huerta’s absence, or if other adult 
family members could assist financially or with childcare, the 
court remanded the case to the district court to determine these 
facts.197 What would happen to his dependents in his absence 
was a major concern for the court. 
After Booker, another federal court expressed a keen inter-
est in the replaceability of a defendant’s caretaking and financial 
support. In United States v. Kon,198 defendant Yit Tin Kon 
pleaded guilty to two felonies related to the possession of and 
intention to distribute MDMA.199 Kon had a two-year-old child 
with her husband (who also happened to be her co-defendant in 
the case) from whom she had separated shortly after they were 
both arrested.200 After the separation, their daughter resided 
with Kon.201 Her husband provided no financial support to them, 
 
 196. Id. at 95. 
 197. Id.  
 198. United States v. Kon, No. 1:04-CR-00271, 2006 WL 3208555 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 2, 2006). Kon, similarly to Huerta, was decided within the Second Circuit. 
Other scholars have noted that the Second Circuit has historically been one of 
the most receptive to family ties and responsibilities departures. See, e.g., Alan 
Ellis & Samuel A. Shummon, Let Judges Be Judges! Post-Koon Downward De-
partures, Part 7: Family Ties and Responsibilities, CRIM. JUST., Summer 1999, 
at 48, 50 (“Among the circuits, the Second Circuit has been the most receptive 
to downward departures for family ties and responsibilities; in comparison with 
other circuit courts, it does not second-guess the factual findings of the lower 
courts concerning the extraordinary nature of the defendant’s family circum-
stances.”); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered 
Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 942–43 (1993) (“The Second 
Circuit has been favorably inclined towards family based departures. . . . Nu-
merous district court cases within the Second Circuit have granted departures 
for single mothers both before and since [United States v.] Johnson, and the 
Second Circuit has virtually invited family ties departures for males and fe-
males.” (footnote omitted)); Karen R. Smith, United States v. Johnson: The Sec-
ond Circuit Overcomes the Sentencing Guidelines’ Myopic View of “Not Ordinar-
ily Relevant” Family Responsibilities of the Criminal Offender, 59 BROOK. L. 
REV. 573, 607 (1993) (“Among the circuits, the Second Circuit seems the most 
receptive to the development, even encouragement, of downward departure ju-
risprudence in [the family ties] area.”). 
 199. Kon, 2006 WL 3208555, at *1. 
 200. Id. at *2. 
 201. Id. 
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had “little to no contact with Kon or their daughter,” and threat-
ened Kon that her child would be taken away from her.202 Kon, 
an immigrant from Malaysia with a junior high education and a 
job washing hair at salons, did not have any immediate family 
in the United States to assist with childcare.203  
The Kon court acknowledged that in the wake of Booker, it 
was obliged to impose a sentence based on consideration of 
§ 3553(a) factors, and one such factor was the Guidelines.204 
First, the court performed a Guidelines calculation: based on 
Kon’s offenses, her acceptance of responsibility, and her criminal 
history, the Guidelines yielded a range for imprisonment at 
thirty to thirty-seven months; a range of supervised release for 
at least three years; and an ineligibility for probation.205 Then, 
the court turned to the remaining factors of § 3553(a), including 
“the history and characteristics of the defendant,”206 which led 
the court to consider “Kon’s extraordinary family circumstances” 
as the sole caretaker for her toddler, without family members 
available for assistance.207 The court recognized its precedents 
for imposing downward departures when incarceration would 
“wreak extraordinary destruction” on the dependents that a de-
fendant would have to leave behind in the case of imprison-
ment.208 The Kon court looked to the Huerta court for the “stand-
ard for weighing the severity of the impact of a defendant’s 
incarceration upon a family’s circumstances,” reiterating the im-
portance of considering a defendant’s irreplaceability in caregiv-
ing and providing for their dependents.209 The Kon court noted:  
While the Huerta court emphasized that all families suffer when a fam-
ily member is incarcerated for any length of time, that expected degree 
of suffering is exacerbated exponentially when no other adult in the 
family can provide alternative means of assistance or support for the 
defendant’s dependents. . . . [W]hen no such reasonable alternative is 
available, and the defendant is the sole care-taker of his or her depend-
ents, a sentencing court can exercise its discretion under a finding of 
extraordinary family circumstances.210 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at *1. 
 205. Id. at *3–4. 
 206. Id. at *4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2018)). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992)).  
 209. Id. at *5. 
 210. Id. 
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The court then found extraordinary circumstances sufficient 
for either a downward departure under Section 5H1.6 or a non-
Guidelines sentence pursuant to the defendant’s history and 
characteristics under § 3553(a)(1).211 After consideration of the 
other § 3553(a) factors (including “the need for the sentence to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense”212 and “provid[ing] ade-
quate general and specific deterrence,”213) Kon was given a non-
Guidelines sentence of one day of incarceration (which she had 
already served by that point) and three years of supervised re-
lease.214  
The Kon court solidified that even after Booker, the Second 
Circuit’s test for extraordinary family circumstances (under ei-
ther Section 51H.6 or § 3553(a)) was a defendant’s replaceability 
as a caregiver and provider for their dependents. Kon wasn’t the 
only court to highlight the importance of a defendant’s irreplace-
ability, but the fact that Kon occurred after Booker sends a mes-
sage to other federal courts that the irreplaceability test is still 
a valid standard to use.215 The old “extraordinary” test need-
lessly focused on the unusualness of a family’s circumstances, as 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at *6. 
 215. Several other courts have also focused on irreplaceability in making 
sentencing decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Daidone, 124 F. App’x 677, 679 
(2d Cir. 2005) (citing six additional cases that consider defendant’s irreplacea-
bility for their dependents); United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir. 
2004) (“[W]e have upheld departures in limited circumstances where a defend-
ant was so irreplaceable that incarceration would cause exceptional hardship to 
his family.”); United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[C]ourts 
have affirmed departures where the evidence established that the care rendered 
by the defendant was irreplaceable.”); United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 
797 (8th Cir. 1994) (granting a downward departure where husband was an 
“irreplaceable” part of his wife’s treatment plan for her “severe” and “potentially 
life threatening” psychiatric problems); United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 
972, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming a downward departure where the minor child 
with whom defendant lived, who suffered from psychological disorders, “would 
risk regression and harm if defendant were incarcerated” and defendant’s “con-
tinued presence was ‘necessary for [the child’s] increasing progress’”); United 
States v. Davis, No. 3:06-CR-00111, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (D. Conn. July 31, 
2006); United States v. Roberts, No. 01-CR-410, 2005 WL 1153757, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2005) (“[Defendant] has satisfied the Second Circuit’s Huerta 
test.”); United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Be-
fore a court . . . can depart downward for ‘extraordinary family obligations’ the 
trial court must measure the defendant against all other defendants, no matter 
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opposed to the family’s needs, and was not consistently or clearly 
implemented. In contrast, the “irreplaceability” test provides an 
opportunity to take the defendant’s support for their dependents 
into account and gives greater weight to a defendant’s role as a 
caregiver. This allows for consideration of what the effects of in-
carceration will be for a defendant’s dependents and a chance to 
mitigate the harm to the family. A more widespread use of the 
“irreplaceability” test could increase the number of parents who 
are able to stay in their homes with their families, instead of be-
ing needlessly incarcerated.  
III.  A JUDICIAL TOOL FOR FEDERAL DOWNWARD 
DEPARTURES: PRESUMING REASONABLENESS IN 
ABSENCE OF REPLACEMENT CARETAKER OR PROVIDER 
CASES 
Parents who provide care and financial support to their de-
pendents face an uphill battle in proving their circumstances to 
be sufficiently “extraordinary” to cause a judge to deviate from 
normal sentencing patterns. As with other areas involving judi-
cial discretion, the differing methods of analysis lead to a lack of 
clarity for parties and inconsistent outcomes across jurisdictions. 
Fortunately, several remedies have been proposed to address 
this issue. This Part will review prior scholarship on ideas to 
bring greater justice into this realm, as well as propose a novel 
solution based on federal precedent. Section C will also address 
counterarguments related to the disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated defendants. 
A. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PARENTAL INCARCERATION 
PROBLEM: A REVIEW 
As the era of mass incarceration continues, and the propor-
tion of incarcerated mothers increases, conversation around the 
issue of incarcerated parents and the effects on their children 
has grown.216 It is not merely the fact that many parents are be-
ing incarcerated that is concerning, but rather that there are 
pathways judges may take to avoid incarcerating parents or to 
incarcerate them for shorter lengths of time (in appropriate sit-
uations) that are not utilized, and the result is parents need-
lessly incarcerated (and children needlessly separated from their 
 
the crime of his or her conviction, and determine whether he or she is ‘irreplace-
able.’”). 
 216. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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parents). Other scholars have researched and detailed several 
proposed solutions to address this issue, and they deserve men-
tion here.217 These solutions offer practical and innovative rem-
edies to address excessive parental incarceration, but some of 
them may prove difficult to implement. 
1. Amending the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Section 
5H1.6) 
Emily W. Andersen advocates for an amendment to Section 
5H1.6 of the Guidelines, which would lead to greater considera-
tion of alternatives to incarceration.218 One (seemingly) simple 
solution to address the inconsistent interpretation of “extraordi-
nary” circumstances among jurisdictions,219 while highlighting 
the importance of family responsibilities, is to amend the Guide-
lines to allow for a lower bar than “extraordinary.”220 Although 
the Guidelines are no longer binding on federal judges, because 
 
 217. Note that these solutions, and indeed this Note, focus on federal sen-
tencing and federal solutions to this issue. While most incarceration happens at 
the state and local level, see Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 34 (noting that ap-
proximately 83% of people incarcerated in the United States are in local jails or 
state prisons), federal systems can have far-reaching impact by influencing 
state policymakers. For a discussion of how states have adopted similar 
schemes, see Markel et al., supra note 187, at 1175–78.  
 218. See Emily W. Andersen, Note, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing 
Family Responsibilities to the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 
1530–33 (2015). In addition to amending Section 5H1.6, Anderson asserts “re-
visions to section 5H1.6 should indicate that, in some circumstances, alternative 
sentences can and should be considered. . . . Such alternatives may provide a 
more efficient way of achieving the same result—punishment of an offender—
without causing negative impacts on an offender’s family.” Id. at 1532–33 (foot-
note omitted). Andersen also advocates for family impact statements to be 
added to presentence investigation reports. See id. at 1533–35. 
 219. See id. at 1521 (“This interpretive disparity [concerning ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances] has persisted even after the U.S. Supreme Court rendered the 
Guidelines advisory in 2005, in United States. [sic] v. Booker.”). “Revising the 
Guidelines would resolve discrepancies in courts’ interpretations of extraordi-
nary or unusual family ties.” Id. at 1531. 
 220. The Guidelines, which currently read, “In sentencing a defendant con-
victed of an offense other than an offense described in the following paragraph, 
family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a departure may be warranted,” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 
144, § 5H1.6, could be edited to strike “not ordinarily relevant” and replace it 
with “may be relevant.”; see also Andersen, supra note 218, at 1531–32. 
  
2602 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2565 
 
many federal judges continue to follow the Guidelines,221 and 
they continue to be considered under § 3553(a) analysis, amend-
ing the Guidelines to more explicitly provide for a judge’s consid-
eration of a defendant’s role in the lives of their dependents will 
likely lead to more judges taking the analysis more seriously.  
While this suggestion is appealing, Amy B. Cyphert notes 
several concerns with its implementation.222 First, amending the 
Guidelines may bring about debates regarding unfair treatment 
for similarly situated defendants;223 the “extraordinary” bar 
served as a gatekeeper, making downward departures for family 
ties an exception, not the rule. Lowering the standard could cre-
ate a scheme where parents are systematically favored. Second, 
critics may assert that too many parents or caregivers may be 
eligible for the departure, incentivizing those who have commit-
ted (or plan to commit) crimes to become pregnant as a get-out-
of-jail-free card.224 Finally, Cyphert highlights the unlikelihood 
of successful legislative and administrative action given the cur-
rent political climate.225  
 
 221. See Cyphert, supra note 99, at 402 (noting that since Booker, judges 
sentencing defendants within the Guidelines (or below the range after a request 
from the government) has “stabiliz[ed] at above eighty percent”). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 410–11 (“The question of whether parents should receive a less-
ened or alternative sentence because of their status as parents is . . . a contro-
versial one. Some commentators have argued that to do so would be to violate 
principles of equal protection, and even incentivize . . . ‘irreplaceable caregiv-
ers’ . . . to engage in criminal behavior.” (footnote omitted)). 
 224. Id. at 406 (“In its opinion, the court noted federal courts’ reluctance to 
grant downward departures where female defendants became pregnant subse-
quent to their arrests or convictions, in part because to do so is to ‘send[] an 
obvious message to all female defendants that pregnancy is ‘a way out.’” (alter-
ation in original) (quoting United States v. McMahill, No. 06-216, 2013 WL 
2186981, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2013))). 
 225. See id. at 413 (“[P]rogress on these issues is increasingly unlikely under 
the Trump Administration . . . .”). Cyphert further explains that “the Sentenc-
ing Commission seeking amendment of a legislative provision from Congress, 
Congress following through, the Commission recommending the appropriate 
amendment to the Guidelines as a result, and Congress approving the amend-
ment—is extraordinarily unlikely in the foreseeable future.” Id. at 416.  
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2. Family Impact Assessments in Presentence Investigation 
Reports 
Andersen (and others226) also argues for incorporating fam-
ily impact assessments into the sentencing process through 
presentence investigation reports by amending Rule 32 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.227 A family impact state-
ment is a set of questions incorporated into presentence investi-
gation reports to solicit information regarding the defendant’s 
children and family members, as well as his or her roles in and 
responsibilities to the family.228 Family impact statements help 
decisionmakers by providing more information about the defend-
ant’s family, as well as the roles and contributions the defendant 
provides, and what the potential effect would be if the defendant 
were incarcerated.229 Andersen hypothesizes that having this in-
formation would help judges to understand a defendant’s life ho-
listically (while still retaining the discretion to determine if the 
circumstance called for a downward departure).230 Several juris-
dictions have already successfully adopted the practice of using 
family impact statements, and probation officers could incorpo-
rate the family impact statement inquiry into their role as inves-
tigators for the court.231 
 
 226. See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, supra note 96, at 45 (“Recom-
mendations and Action Steps . . . Family Impact Assessment in Judicial Hear-
ings: Establish a protocol for assessing family impact at sentencing and what 
can be done to alleviate undue stress on the children.”); Christian, supra note 
21, at 8 (“States could require, in appropriate cases, that pre-sentence investi-
gation reports include a family impact statement, including recommendations 
for the ‘least detrimental alternative’ sentence and for services to and supports 
for children during a parent’s imprisonment.”). 
 227. See Andersen, supra note 218, at 1533–35. 
 228. See LINDSEY CRAMER ET AL., URBAN INST., TOOLKIT FOR DEVELOPING 
FAMILY IMPACT STATEMENTS: CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS PROJECT 
3 (2015), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/53651/2000253 
-Toolkit-for-Developing-Family-Impact-Statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX4X 
-KA6Q].  
 229. Id.  
 230. Andersen, supra note 218, at 1515–16 (“Although some of the infor-
mation provided in a family impact assessment is already included in a presen-
tence investigation report, the family impact assessment brings together this 
scattered information, sometimes supplementing it with additional details, in 
order to foreground the burden a sentence will place on the defendant’s fam-
ily.”); id. at 1533–34. 
 231. Id. at 1534–35. 
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Cyphert again expresses concern with this solution, noting 
that, 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a compli-
cated and time consuming process that involves Congress, the  
Supreme Court, advisory committees, and public notice and com-
ment. . . . [R]eliance on rule change as a method of addressing the chal-
lenges faced by incarcerated parents and their children may be mis-
placed.232  
Instead, Cyphert suggests the more moderate fix that individual 
judges could use their power to require family impact statements 
in their own courtrooms.233 Cyphert’s solution empowers judges 
to gather the information they need for just decision making 
without the burden of amending laws. 
3. Policy Improvements 
Numerous sources investigating the effects of incarcerating 
parents cite various policy solutions to mitigate the harm on chil-
dren and families. Innovative programs allowing mothers to re-
main with their infants in prison nurseries or community-based 
residential parenting programs have shown great promise,234 
and expanding the eligibility pool of such programs would serve 
even more families.235 Nine states have had prison nurseries, 
and such nurseries have existed in the United States for over 
100 years.236 These unique opportunities provide strong incen-
tives for parent participants to remain in good standing by fol-
lowing the prison rules.237 It is possible that prison nurseries 
 
 232. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 411–12 (footnote omitted). 
 233. Id. at 418. Cyphert specifically advocates for judges to use Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 32(d)(2)(G), which “requires that the presentence inves-
tigation report include ‘any other information that the court requires, including 
information relevant to the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),’” to mandate a 
section about collateral consequences in the presentence report, which would 
include consequences for dependents. Id. at 420 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 
32(d)(2)(G)). 
 234. See Halter, supra note 108, at 549–51, 557–64 (explaining that a par-
ent’s constitutional right to parent should be honored by allowing the parent to 
live with their infant, noting how this regime would be compatible with the 
criminal justice system, and listing policy justifications). 
 235. See KAREN SHAIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S MOTHER-INFANT PRISON PRO-
GRAMS: AN INVESTIGATION 21 (2010), https://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/CA-Mother-Infant-Prison-Programs_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FNM4-XNKA] (recommending such an expansion).  
 236. SARAH DIAMOND, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AND FACT SHEET FOR CT 1 (2012), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/f2f533_ 
fc7cfce398854a27a5b2c65feb8a8efc.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AUK-3WB4].  
 237. Id. at 3. 
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may be comparable in price to the cost of foster care, and with 
separate areas for mothers and young children protecting them 
from violence, a mother who would like to raise her child while 
incarcerated could be afforded the invaluable opportunity to 
spend vital attachment time with her infant.238 
When cohabitation is not feasible, visitation can be an im-
portant point of contact for children and their parents, mitigat-
ing some of the harms of separation.239 Incarceration facilities 
can improve their visitation policies by explicitly encouraging 
and enabling children to participate in the visitation program, 
avoiding onerous clothing requirements for visitors, allowing for 
toys and age-appropriate activities in the visitation spaces, per-
mitting appropriate physical contact, timing visiting hours to 
make sense with work and school schedules, expanding visiting 
hours, and partnering with local nonprofit organizations.240 
States can also inquire where a child will be living during the 
period of incarceration and work to place incarcerated parents in 
facilities closer to their children to ease the traveling burden for 
children and their caregivers.241 
Funding for greater governmental support to children of in-
carcerated parents and resources for family caregivers, such as 
reunification services and financial assistance, would also assist 
families.242 Intermittent sentencing can allow parents to serve 
their sentences in smaller chunks of time instead of all at once, 
such as weekdays from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM.243 Finally, greater 
 
 238. Jennifer Warner, Note, Infants in Orange: An International Model-
Based Approach to Prison Nurseries, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 65, 89–90 
(2015). 
 239. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 394–95 (“Numerous studies have concluded 
that frequent and high quality visits between incarcerated parents and their 
children are beneficial for both . . . . Visits have also been shown to reduce re-
cidivism rates amongst incarcerated parents and improve long-term success 
upon reentry.”). 
 240. Id. at 422–26. 
 241. Christian, supra note 21, at 8. 
 242. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 15, 
at 11 (“Recommendations . . . To the Congress of the United States . . . Pass leg-
islation to provide targeted support to children with incarcerated parents, reu-
nification services for incarcerated parents, and financial assistance and other 
resources to family caregivers.”). 
 243. Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant’s Children at Sentencing, 2 
FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 198 (1990). For example, when twenty-year-old Monalisa 
Perez accidentally shot and killed her boyfriend (and the father of her two chil-
dren) Pedro Ruiz III during a YouTube stunt gone wrong, the judge “allowed 
Perez to serve her sentence in 10-day increments in South Dakota, where she 
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use of alternatives to incarceration in general would afford par-
ents the opportunity to continue living in their communities, 
providing a sense of normalcy for their children.244  
4. Cementing the Constitutional Right To Parent for the 
Incarcerated 
Amongst the emotional anguish, logistical challenges, and 
serious risk of termination of parental rights that comes along 
with parental incarceration, displacement of a child, and the po-
tential for foster care, there is one missing component: a protec-
tion of the parent’s constitutional right to parent. Unfortunately, 
the United States justice system does not value the fundamental 
right to parent for prisoners. The Supreme Court has recognized 
a fundamental right, protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,245 to raise, parent, and control one’s child.246 Parents have 
a right to make decisions related to healthcare, child labor, dis-
cipline (including corporal punishment), where the child lives,247 
 
now lives.” Tu-Uyen Tran, Minnesota Woman Sentenced for Fatally Shooting 
Boyfriend in Failed YouTube Stunt, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS, https:// 
www.twincities.com/2018/03/14/minnesota-woman-sentenced-for-fatally 
-shooting-boyfriend-in-failed-youtube-stunt/ [https://perma.cc/D4X9-HJ9C] 
(last updated Mar. 15, 2018); see also State v. Perez, 54-CR-17-185 (D. Minn. 
June 28, 2017). 
 244. Julie Smyth, Dual Punishment: Incarcerated Mothers and Their Chil-
dren, III COLUM. SOCIAL WORK REV. 33, 41 (2012).  
 245. See generally, Roger M. Baron, A Parent’s Constitutional Right to Pos-
session of His Children, 7 PROB. L.J. 251 (1987).  
 246. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a 
parent adequately cares for [their] children (i.e., is fit), there will . . . be no rea-
son for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning 
the . . . children.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is car-
dinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (finding another education statute (requiring children to 
attend public schools instead of religious ones) unconstitutional, noting that 
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 
401 (1923) (finding an education statute (forbidding schools from teaching chil-
dren foreign languages) an unconstitutional infringement with a parent’s right 
“to control the education of their own,” and that due process protections include 
the right to “establish a home and bring up children”).  
 247. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
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who they can speak with, and so on.248 Ordinarily, the govern-
ment defers to parental prerogatives in nearly all aspects of a 
child’s life,249 unless two parents are in a dispute, or a parent is 
unfit or unable to continue caring for their child.250 As with other 
fundamental protections the Court has identified, the right to 
parent is well documented and protected in the United States.251 
In general, the incarcerated have all of the “rights which 
have not been taken away from them expressly or by necessary 
implication of law.”252 They “retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons,”253 yet they do not retain rights that are 
 
 248. See JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 141–48 (2014). 
These rights apply to parents that still have legal rights over their child or chil-
dren. 
 249. There are some government regulations that take precedence over pa-
rental prerogatives, such as state compulsory education laws. See generally 
RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS 
AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 1:6 COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND SCHOOL 
REGULATION (2004); limitations on child labor, 29 CFR § 570.2 (2019), 29 CFR 
§§ 570.31–34 (2019); and prohibitions against abuse and neglect. See Definitions 
of Child Abuse and Neglect in Federal Law, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/can/defining/federal/ [https://perma.cc/ 
XU29-5N32].  
 250. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69 (noting that the State will not “inject itself 
into the private realm of the family” when a parent or parents are “fit”). Paren-
tal prerogatives are not deferred to in custody disputes (as each parent’s pre-
rogatives may be in stark contrast with the other’s); instead, the “best interest 
of the child” standard is generally used. Donald K. Sherman, Child Custody and 
Visitation, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 691, 701 (2005) (“If parents are unable to 
reach a child custody agreement . . . courts may intervene in custody and visit-
ation disputes. The standard for deciding these cases is the ‘best interest of the 
child standard’; it is the same in all fifty states.”). 
 251. For a robust discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment right to parent, 
see Halter, supra note 108, at 553–57. 
 252. RUSSELL J. DAVIS, 73 OHIO JURIS., PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITU-
TIONS, § 145 CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF INMATES, GENERALLY 
(Lexis 2018). Prisoners in the United States retain many important constitu-
tional protections (but usually with many caveats and limitations), such as the 
“right of meaningful access to courts”; First Amendment rights of speech, reli-
gion, and association; very limited (but still preserved) privacy rights; Eighth 
Amendment protection against “cruel and unusual” punishment; procedural 
due process protections; and rights to equal protection. Substantive Rights Re-
tained by Prisoners, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1025, 1025–28, 1031, 
1038–41, 1054, 1064 (2012).  
 253. DAVIS, supra note 252. 
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“inconsistent with status as a prisoner or with legitimate peno-
logical objectives.”254 But amongst the prisoner’s right to other 
family connections, such as the right to get married,255 the 
United States does not recognize a parent’s right to visit with 
their child,256 much less communicate with them. Incarceration, 
therefore, is not just a period of limited liberty, but a dangerous 
zone of unprotected rights and risk of damaging or severing a 
parent-child relationship. 
Enforcing the fundamental right to parent could be a possi-
ble avenue for securing more protections and options for incar-
cerated parents. Emily Halter argues that “incarcerated women 
have a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
parent their children. Consequently, state and federal prisons in 
the United States should be required to provide options to facil-
itate that right.”257 Halter explains that Supreme Court prece-
dent dictates that a mother’s constitutional right to parent her 
children can only be revoked if she is found to be unfit.258 Incar-
ceration alone does not imply an inability to parent well (or a 
history of poor parenting), especially given the prevalence of in-
carceration due to low-level drug offenses and nonviolent 
crimes.259 Halter advocates for allowing incarcerated women to 
remain with their children during incarceration through prison 
nurseries and “community-based residential parenting pro-
grams.”260 Even if courts are unwilling or unable to vindicate 
this right, she adds, legislatures should take the lead in making 
important and impactful policy changes to implement better op-
tions for incarcerated mothers and their children.261 Again, un-
fortunately, this proposal requires courts or legislatures to take 
big leaps and advocate fiercely for a politically weak population. 
 
 254. Id.; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (noting that an 
inmate “retains those [constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his 
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the correc-
tions system”) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
 255. Safley, 482 U.S. at 96 (finding that prisoners maintain the constitu-
tional right to marry). 
 256. George L. Blum, Annotation, Right of Jailed or Imprisoned Parent to 
Visit from Minor Child, 6 A.L.R.6th 483 (2005); see also Cyphert, supra note 99, 
at 409 (noting “the daunting Supreme Court precedents that provide essentially 
no right to visitation for inmates”). 
 257. Halter, supra note 108, at 553. 
 258. Id. at 554 (referencing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)). 
 259. Id. at 554–55. 
 260. Id. at 544. 
 261. Id. at 545, 561–64. 
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These ideas have yet to be enacted on a national scale. While 
there is recent a senate bill262 (and a mirrored house bill263) that 
makes some policy changes (codifying special rights for visita-
tions, parenting classes, and free phone and video calls264), nei-
ther bill has made much progress towards being enacted.265 With 
a closely divided Senate266 and a president that prides himself 
on enforcing “law and order,”267 it is uncertain if any of these 
changes will be enacted anytime soon. However, recent biparti-
san support for the passage of a criminal justice reform bill268 
may indicate that the time is now for criminal laws to adapt with 
the changing times. 
Each of these proposed solutions holds promise, and all are 
worthy of pursuit. Yet many of these suggestions require consid-
erable change, effort, and political cooperation. Parental incar-
ceration and the ensuing family separation affects millions of 
parents and children, so the need for reform is urgent. 
 
 262. Next Step Act of 2019, S. 697, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 263. Next Step Act of 2019, H.R. 1893, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 264. S. 697 § 602; H.R. 1893 § 602 (2019). 
 265. As of January 13, 2020, S. 697 had zero cosponsors and H.R. 1893 had 
two. See Bill Cosponsor S.697, CONG.GOV., https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th 
-congress/senate-bill/697cosponsers/ [https://perma.ccZ2G8-R4UA]; Bill Co-
sponsor H.R. 1893, CONG.GOV., https://www.congress.gov/bill116th-congress/ 
house-bill/1893/cosponsors/ [https://perma.cc/7ZTJ-HP2Z]. 
 266. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv 
.htm [https://perma.cc/SU8K-UBTQ] (noting fifty-three Republicans and forty-
five Democrats in the 2019–21 Senate). 
 267. Terence McArdle, The ‘Law and Order’ Campaign that Won Richard 
Nixon the White House 50 Years Ago, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/history/2018/11/05/law-order-campaign-that-won-richard 
-nixon-white-house-years-ago/?utm_term=.3f08cbc1d271 [https://perma.cc/ 
28LS-J3KF] (“Donald Trump invoked the phrase ‘silent majority’ during his 
presidential run and, lately, has seized on another Nixon favorite: ‘law and or-
der.’”).  
 268. See First Step Act of 2018, S. Res. 756, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/756 [https://perma.cc/ 
5BLG-ERV3]; German Lopez, Congress Just Passed the Most Significant Crim-
inal Justice Reform Bill in Decades, VOX (Dec. 20, 2018, 1:55 PM), https:// 
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/12/20/18148482/first-step-act-criminal 
-justice-reform-house-congress [https://perma.cc/WA34-L8UM] (detailing the 
passage of the First Step Act). 
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B. JUDICIAL ACTION: DEFENDANT’S STATUS AS PRIMARY 
CARETAKER OF DEPENDENT(S) AS PRESUMPTIVELY REASONABLE 
GROUNDS FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE  
Huerta and Kon provide a dormant remedy that has yet to 
gain attention by the legal academic and policy communities 
(although some other courts269 have followed the “irreplaceabil-
ity” test articulated in Huerta and Kon). These federal cases 
stand for the notion that in an analysis of a defendant’s caregiv-
ing and financial support to their dependents (under either a 
Section 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities or a section 
3553(a) defendant history and characteristics analysis), the pri-
mary issue is how the defendant’s dependents will fare in the 
absence of the defendant’s caretaking and financial support ser-
vices. Kon asserts that “[w]hen no other adult in the family can 
provide alternative means of assistance or support for the de-
fendant’s dependents,” it is reasonable for the court to find “ex-
traordinary” family circumstances and grant a downward depar-
ture.270 
This test, which boils down to labeling an irreplaceable271 
caregiver defendant as an “extraordinary” family circumstance, 
requires no new laws, but merely following federal district and 
circuit court precedent. In fact, the test could be viewed as 
merely an extension of preexisting factors in Section 5H1.6,272 a 
 
 269. See supra note 215. 
 270. United States v. Kon, No. 1:04-CR-00271, 2006 WL 3208555, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y 2006). 
 271. For another scholar noting the prevalence of “irreplaceability” analysis, 
see Markel et al., supra note 187, at 1172–73 (“To the extent that there is pat-
tern underlying the pre-Booker federal cases involving downward departures 
for family ties, it is discernible by asking whether the defendant provided an ir-
replaceable (or at least critical) role as caregiver to family dependents.”). 
 272. Section 5H1.6 provides: 
(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial Support.—A 
departure under this policy statement based on the loss of caretaking 
or financial support of the defendant’s family requires . . . the presence 
of the following circumstances: (i) The defendant’s service of a sentence 
within the applicable guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, 
and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, 
to the defendant’s family. (ii) The loss of caretaking or financial sup-
port substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarcera-
tion for a similarly situated defendant . . . . (iii) The loss of caretaking 
or financial support is one for which no effective remedial or ameliora-
tive programs reasonably are available, making the defendant’s care-
taking or financial support irreplaceable to the defendant’s family. 
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component of the Guidelines which must be considered under 
§ 3553(a).273 This test has the potential to gain traction274 
through individual judges invoking Huerta and/or Kon as justi-
fications for their decisions.275 The solidification of the test 
through greater usage across district and circuit courts (or, per-
haps, the Supreme Court) would carry the advantage that it will 
signal to other judges that utilizing the test will be presumed 
“reasonable,”276 potentially lessening any fears lower court 
judges may have of being overturned.277 “Irreplaceability” need 
not be a strict or singular path towards a downward departure 
 
(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or fi-
nancial support. 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 463 
 273. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5) (2018). 
 274. As of January 2020, just five federal cases (all in New York) have cited 
Kon. See, e.g., United States v. Marsh, 820 F. Supp. 2d 320, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(citing Kon as a case “imposing a non-guidelines sentence in light of family cir-
cumstances where defendant was the mother of a two year-old daughter and the 
father was no longer involved in raising the child”), as amended (Nov. 3, 2011). 
Huerta has been cited (as of January 2020) by thirty-one other cases (including 
Kon), but only five cases reference Huerta for its “irreplaceability” test. United 
States v. Daidone, 124 F. App’x 677, 679 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Dai-
done, 112 F. App’x 104, 105 (2d Cir. 2004), order amended and superseded, 124 
F. App’x 677 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Bueno, No. 09 CR 625(HB), 2010 
WL 2228570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2010); United States v. Davis, Crim. No. 
3-06-CR-111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006); United 
States v. Roberts, No. 01 CR, 410(RWS), 2005 WL 1153757, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 
16, 2005). An additional case cites Huerta more broadly, but still under a family 
ties departure analysis. United States v. Cabrera, CR No. 07-077-ML, 2009 WL 
1530703, at *3 (D.R.I. May 28, 2009). 
 275. While a more formalized solidification of the irreplaceability test is pos-
sible, for reasons cited in Part III.A above, they are not likely to happen anytime 
soon. An amendment to the Guidelines would be unlikely as it is a challenging 
process that does not invoke much hope without strong indicators of Congress 
and the United States Sentencing Commissions’ intent to make such reforms. 
Nor does it appear that the Supreme Court of the United States will soon take 
this issue under its purview. Therefore, this Note will focus instead on individ-
ual judges taking up the irreplaceability test. For notes about the challenges of 
amending the Guidelines, see Cyphert, supra note 99, at 413–16. 
 276. United States v. Booker invalidated the prior appellate review stand-
ards by excising § 3742(e), shifting the appellate review standard from de novo 
review to “review for ‘unreasonable[ness].’” 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005). 
 277. “[M]any federal judges in the years since [Booker] have hewed rather 
tightly to the Guidelines, with compliance stabilizing at above eighty percent. 
Various theories for this phenomenon have been suggested, including fear of 
non-Guidelines sentences being overturned (as predicted by Justice Souter in 
his dissent in Rita) . . .” Cyphert, supra note 99, at 402–03 (referring to Justice 
Souter’s dissent in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)). 
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for family ties and responsibilities, but departures resulting 
from irreplaceable defendants should be presumed reasona-
ble.278 
There is much room for further articulating what criteria 
should be applied for determining what “irreplaceable” means. 
For example, courts could consider the defendant’s special skills, 
characteristics, or relationships as important components of 
their caregiving. Courts might also see if there is a willing and 
appropriate substitute available to provide care for dependents 
if the defendant is incarcerated. The cost of the defendant’s in-
carceration could be compared to the cost of hiring a replacement 
caregiver or compared to the lost income a family would experi-
ence if a defendant were incarcerated. Statements from depend-
ents, and those who would have to provide additional support in 
the defendant’s absence, could be taken into consideration. Ad-
ditional attention may be afforded to dependents that are ill, dis-
abled, or otherwise require specialized or difficult care. Defend-
ants could be given an opportunity to explain to the court why 
their presence in their homes and communities would bring 
greater public safety than their incarceration. A judge will be 
able to make the most just ruling given a full articulation of 
every negative consequence of incarceration (such as lost care-
giving and financial support, the literal costs of housing someone 
in a jail or prison, as well as strain on alternative caregivers and 
communities) as well as every positive effect of allowing a de-
fendant to avoid incarceration (such as family and community 
preservation). Judges may consider all of these factors and more 
in considering whether a defendant is irreplaceable, and in ap-
propriate cases, relieving a defendant and their family of a need-
lessly burdensome incarceration. As more judges utilize the irre-
placeability test and articulate the factors important to their 
 
 278. The 2002 Federal District of Massachusetts case United States v. 
Lacarubba criticized the United States v. Pereira court for too stringently hold-
ing to the “irreplaceability” standard, especially as compared to the Second Cir-
cuit, which had found sufficient reason for family tie departures without a strict 
finding of irreplaceability. United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94–
96 (D. Mass. 2002). Lacarubba noted that finding a replacement caregiver is not 
always a sufficient replacement: “Caretaking, in short, goes beyond physical 
acts, and includes emotional and psychological attachments. It is not just a 
question of any two arms, any old paycheck. A husband of thirty years stands 
in a different position relative to a wife than any caregiver.” Id. at 98. Similarly, 
this Note does not advocate for such a strict adherence to the “irreplaceability” 
test as to exclude those whose care could potentially be replaced by a hired care-
giver but would result in a hardship for the dependent who requires care. 
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analysis, the test will become clearer for future courts and par-
ties to use. 
The concretization of the irreplaceable defendant test would 
impact the disparate outcomes for parent-defendants across 
courts, particularly in regard to single parents and sole care pro-
viders. While the Second Circuit certainly maintains a pattern 
of acknowledging the plight of single parents or parents caring 
for their entire households,279 still many other judges have de-
nied departures for these caretakers and providers.280 Consider-
ing the prevalence of parental incarceration, the growth of ma-
ternal incarceration, and the accompanying harms to children, 
parents, and the communities, it is sensible and prudent to en-
courage (through formal or informal means) judges to utilize ex-
isting federal precedent to take a defendant’s dependents into 
consideration at sentencing. 
C. COUNTERARGUMENT: DISPARATE TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY 
SITUATED DEFENDANTS 
Critics may assert that consideration of the support a de-
fendant provides for their dependents creates a scheme in which 
similarly situated defendants (as in, defendants who committed 
the same or similar crimes) would have different sentences,281 or 
 
 279. United States v. Kon references three Second Circuit cases where de-
partures were upheld for such reasons: (1) “where defendant provided substan-
tial support for two children and defendant’s wife spoke limited English,” 
United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir.1997), (2) “where defend-
ant was sole supporter of four young children,” United States v. Johnson, 964 
F.2d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 1992), and (3) “where defendant supported wife, two 
young children, and his disabled father, who relied on defendant to get out of 
his wheelchair” United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991)). 
United States v. Kon, No. 1:04-CR-00271, 2006 WL 3208555, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov 2, 2006). 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. Trinidad-Toledo, No. CR 06-1646 JB, 2007 
WL 506190, at *1 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2007), aff’d, 260 F. App’x 74 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to grant a downward departure, despite the fact that the defendant 
was “the sole source of income and support for his disabled wife . . . and his 
eight-year old daughter”); United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 807–08 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (denying a downward departure where defendant was “a single father 
of two young children who might be placed in foster care if [Defendant]’s brother 
refuse[d] to take them into his home”); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33–
34 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying downward departure for a single mother of two chil-
dren who would go into foster care if she were incarcerated). 
 281. See, e.g., Cyphert, supra note 99, at 410 (“The question of whether par-
ents should receive a lessened or alternative sentence because of their status as 
parents is, of course, a controversial one. Some commentators have argued that 
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may perversely incentivize certain defendants to commit 
crimes.282 Some may say that prison nurseries, even if they could 
be cost-effective and safe for children, detract from the purpose 
of punishing the defendant.283 These criticisms evoke questions 
of basic fairness, the intention of punishment in the United 
States legal system, the consequences of having children or re-
maining childless, and who bears the burden of punishment. 
If United States federal sentencing law was only concerned 
with proportionally punishing the defendant’s crime, then this 
disparity would be an improper result. Defendants with children 
or dependent family members could get an unfair advantage 
over other defendants who committed the same or similar of-
fense. In fact, one of the aims of the Sentencing Guidelines is to 
lessen disparities among similarly situated defendants.284 The 
 
to do so would be to violate principles of equal protection . . . .”); Markel et 
al., supra note 187, at 1215 (“A person who commits a crime can reasonably 
foresee that if prosecuted and punished, his punishment will affect not only 
himself but also his family. Just about everyone acknowledges that extending a 
discount to an offender for a reason unrelated to his crime constitutes an unde-
served windfall.”). 
 282. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 410–11 (noting commentators’ concerns that 
alternative or lessened sentences for parents could “incentivize certain groups 
of people (namely ‘irreplaceable caregivers’) to engage in criminal behavior,” 
and citing a federal court’s concern for “sending an obvious message to all female 
defendants that pregnancy is ‘a way out’”) (quoting United States v. Pozzy, 902 
F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990)); Markel et al., supra note 187, at 1215 (“[G]iving 
benefits to defendants with family ties in the currency of sentencing discounts 
will also, on the margin, incentivize this class of defendants to seek out greater 
criminal opportunities, or they will be recruited or pressed into action by oth-
ers.”). 
 283. Warner, supra note 238, at 90 (“Empowering mothers to make a choice 
about their newborn and possibly raise their newborn during a prison sentence 
is in opposition to what the United States criminal justice system is trying to 
achieve.”). 
 284. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2018) (“The court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider— . . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.”); see also OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM’N, PRIMER: DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES, 47–48 (2016), https:// 
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2016_Primer_Departure_ 
Variance.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6ZV-S4CT] (noting that a “district court [is] not 
‘forbidden to consider the guidelines and the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tence disparities when exercising its discretion; to the contrary, ‘the governing 
statute directs the sentencing court to consider these matters as two factors 
among several in the sentencing process’” (quoting United States v. Ruelas-
Mendez, 556 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 2009))). However, an Eighth Circuit court 
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advantage for those defendants with children necessarily results 
in a disadvantage for those who are childless, arbitrarily reward-
ing those who have exercised their right to have a child and pun-
ishing those who have not exercised this right. 
However, the unlawful act alone is not the only considera-
tion at sentencing. Both the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “Factors To Be 
Considered in Imposing a Sentence”285 and the Sentencing 
Guidelines286 take factors besides the defendant’s crime into ac-
count, such as “the history and characteristics of the defend-
ant,”287 consideration of specific offender characteristics,288 the 
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,289 and if a proposed sen-
tence “will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essen-
tial caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s 
 
recently found that the effort to avoid unwarranted disparities referred to na-
tional disparities, not differences between the sentences of co-conspirators. 
Roger W. Haines, Jr. et al., Federal Sentencing Guide: § 716 Departures: Dis-
parity Between Co-Defendants, FED. SENTENCING GUIDE, https:// 
sentencingcases.com/700-departures-generally-§5k/715-specific-grounds-for 
-departure-§5k2/716-disparity-between-co-defendants [https://perma.cc/5EYV 
-J3NN]; see United States v. Hemsher, 893 F.3d 525, 535 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 470 (2018) (“[Defendant] argues the great disparity between 
his sentence and those of the cooperating co-defendants is evidence that his sen-
tence is unreasonable. . . . However, [defendant]’s argument founders [sic] on 
the mistaken premise that the statutory direction to avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities among defendants refers to differences among co-conspira-
tors. It does not.”); United States v. Pierre, 870 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(“The statutory direction to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants, 
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(6), refers to national disparities, not differences among co-
conspirators.”). 
 285. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018). 
 286. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 376, 458–65. 
 287. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
 288. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 144, at 458–65 (listing the following 
as potentially relevant offender characteristics in sentencing: age, education 
and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, physical condition (“In-
cluding Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction”), employ-
ment record, family ties and responsibilities, role in the offense, criminal his-
tory, “Dependence upon Criminal Activity for a Livelihood,” and “Military, 
Civic, Charitable, or Public Service; Employment-Related Contributions; Rec-
ord of Prior Good Works;” but prohibiting consideration of “Race, Sex, National 
Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status” as relevant factors). But 
see id. at 470–71 (noting that certain factors may only be taken under consider-
ation under specific provisions, such as taking “defendant’s acceptance of re-
sponsibility” into consideration under § 3E1.1, and taking “defendant’s aggra-
vating or mitigating role in the offense” into consideration under § 3B1.1 and 
§ 3B1.2). 
 289. Id. at 376. 
  
2616 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:2565 
 
family.”290 Federal judges are instructed to review “the need for 
the sentence imposed” in terms of proportionality, deterrence, 
and the most effective treatment.291 Therefore, the sentencing 
structure was never intended to be a direct comparison of the 
culpability of two defendants based exclusively on the crime(s) 
each committed. Rather, judges have the discretion to take into 
consideration relevant factors, including those that affect the de-
fendant’s family members and dependents. People have compli-
cated pasts and extenuating circumstances, and “[e]ach of us is 
more than the worst thing we’ve ever done.”292 
Departures were built into the Sentencing Guidelines to ac-
count for the difficulty in accurately and fairly applying a stand-
ardized system to each individual case.293 The purposes of pun-
ishment in the federal sentencing system extend beyond merely 
retribution for the offense committed.294 When one defendant 
has dependents that rely upon them for care and support, an-
other defendant who committed the same or similar offense (but 
lacks dependents) is not similarly situated.295 Taking these de-
pendents into consideration at sentencing does not lessen the 
culpability of the defendant, but rather takes into account an-
other factor worth consideration at sentencing: excessive hard-
ship on vulnerable dependents.296 
 
 290. Id. at 462–63 (USSG § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(i)). 
 291. 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 
 292. BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMP-
TION 17–18 (2014). 
 293. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 144, at 7 (“[I]t is difficult to pre-
scribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human con-
duct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision. . . . [T]he Commission, over 
time, will be able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when depar-
tures should and should not be permitted.”). 
 294. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). 
 295. For an example of a court acknowledging the disparity argument but 
finding the departure warranted nonetheless based on the implicit conclusion 
that similarly situated defendants may be different due to their caregiving re-
sponsibilities, see United States v. Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp. 2d 89, 98–99 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (“If this departure means other offenders without dying spouses get 
longer sentences, so be it; it is warranted by the Guidelines, by the facts, by our 
common humanity.”). 
 296. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129–30 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(“The rationale for a downward departure here is not that Johnson’s family cir-
cumstances decrease her culpability, but that we are reluctant to wreak extraor-
dinary destruction on dependents who rely solely on the defendant for their up-
bringing. . . . ‘[The hardship of] those children being without a mother for an 
extended period of time . . . was extraordinary grounds for a departure.’”); 
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Carrying the burden of raising the next generation and re-
populating the future workforce by having children is a pursuit 
that the state routinely supports. While taxes are uniformly ap-
plied to adults with and without children, parents are offered tax 
credits for having children,297 and government money funds pub-
lic schools and playgrounds.298 This is one example of the state 
acknowledging the difficult but important work of parenting, 
and taking children’s needs into consideration when requiring 
resources from or allocating resources to adults. Just as a de-
fendant is greater than their crime, an adult is more than an 
island without connections. Sentencing law in the United States 
was never intended to evaluate someone in a vacuum when peo-
ple lead complicated, intersectional lives that deeply affect oth-
ers. 
Defendants are not the only ones suffering from the effects 
of incarceration and family separation. Cyphert argues that in-
carcerating parents and refusing to allow them to communicate 
with and parent their children often leads to inevitable and un-
just punishment for those children, who are blameless.299 Pro-
fessor Sarah Abramowicz posits that if children are to be held 
accountable as autonomous adults later in life, then the criminal 
justice system must take them into consideration when sentenc-
ing parents, because incarcerating a parent can be so detri-
mental to a child’s development and wellbeing that they do not 
form to become fully rational and legal adults.300 One scholar 
 
Lacarubba, 184 F. Supp.at 98–99 (“These family responsibilities do not remotely 
lessen the defendant’s culpability for the crimes he has committed. I depart only 
in recognition of my unwillingness to wreak havoc on the life of the dying Ms. 
LaCarubba [defendant’s wife] . . . .”). 
 297. Richard Auxier et al., The Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book: Key Ele-
ments of the U.S. Tax System, What is the Child Tax Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing 
-book/what-child-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/H7U7-9HEZ].  
 298. Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 25, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget 
-and-tax/policy-basics-where-do-our-state-tax-dollars-go [https://perma.cc/6R2L 
-F55M].  
 299. Cyphert, supra note 99, at 387 (“These blameless children, who have 
done nothing wrong, nonetheless will ‘do the time’ with their parents, and will 
likely experience a myriad of negative impacts. . . . [S]entencing judges have 
largely accepted as a given, reluctantly or not, that these children are to be pun-
ished alongside their parents.”). 
 300. Abramowicz, supra note 25, at 798 (“If criminal law is to treat adults as 
if they are autonomous, then it needs to take responsibility for any actions that 
will render a child less so, such as the decision to incarcerate the parent of a 
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went so far as to assert a constitutional right for children to 
maintain a relationship with their incarcerated parents.301 As 
much as possible, fit and interested parents should not be de-
prived of the opportunity to parent their children; anything less 
serves undue hardship onto their children. 
CONCLUSION 
In the age of mass incarceration, and with the recent rapid 
expansion of the number of incarcerated mothers, it has never 
been more important to inspect the impact of parental incarcer-
ation on children. The repercussions of maternal incarceration, 
which represents many caregivers in the United States, are per-
vasive and long-reaching. While United States federal sentenc-
ing law has long recognized extraordinary family circumstances 
as worthy of consideration at sentencing, inconsistent imple-
mentation and insufficient clarification have resulted in dispar-
ate outcomes.  
United States v. Huerta and United States v. Kon provide 
judges with an additional tool within their arsenal of just sen-
tencing practices: the presumption that it is reasonable for fed-
eral judges to grant downward departures for defendants who 
are sole or primary caregivers of their dependents, and whom 
are effectively irreplaceable. By spreading the use of and ampli-
fying the precedent that creates the irreplaceability test, courts 
can take family impact into account, and lessen the impactful 
harms that parental incarceration has on all involved. 
 
 
minor child.”); see also Warner, supra note 238, at 90 (“What the criminal justice 
system and society forget is that these women are not merely ‘prisoners’—they 
are mothers, and the future of their children is at stake.”). 
 301. Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitu-
tional Right to the Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 80 
(2011) (“[This Article] puts forward the First Amendment freedom of association 
and the due process liberty interest as the legal bases for children’s right to a 
relationship with their convicted parents.”). 
